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COMPARING MATERIAL AND STRUCTURAL SET THEORIES
MICHAEL SHULMAN
Abstract. We study elementary theories of well-pointed toposes and preto-
poses, regarded as category-theoretic or “structural” set theories in the spirit
of Lawvere’s “Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets”. We consider
weak intuitionistic and predicative theories of pretoposes, and we also propose
category-theoretic versions of stronger axioms such as unbounded separation,
replacement, and collection. Finally, we compare all of these theories formally
to traditional membership-based or “material” set theories, using a version of
the classical construction based on internal well-founded relations.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Overview. It is well-known that elementary topos theory is equiconsistent
with a weak form of set theory. The most common statement of this relates the
theory of a well-pointed topos with a natural numbers object and satisfying the
axiom of choice (a.k.a. ETCS; see [Law64]) to “bounded Zermelo” set theory (BZC).
This is originally due to Cole [Col73] and Mitchell [Mit72]; see also Osius [Osi74] and
for a more recent exposition [MLM94, Ch. VI]. Moreover, the proof is very direct:
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2 MICHAEL SHULMAN
the category of sets in any model of BZC is a model of ETCS, while from any model
of ETCS one can construct a model of BZC out of well-founded relations.1
Our goal is to obtain analogous results for stronger and weaker theories in a
unified framework. On the one hand, by removing axioms such as choice, classical
logic, and power sets from BZC, we obtain intuitionistic and predicative set theories
which correspond to more general toposes and pretoposes. On the other hand, we
propose category-theoretic properties which correspond to set-theoretic axioms such
as separation, replacement, and collection. In particular, we characterize toposes
that are the category of sets in a model of ZFC, as did Osius, Lawvere, and also
McLarty [McL04]; but our result generalizes to the intuitionistic case.
In this paper we deal entirely with (pre)toposes which correspond directly to set
theories, in such a way that the set-theoretic elements of a set X are in bijection
with its category-theoretic “global elements” 1 → X. In particular, any object of
such a category must be determined by its global elements, which is to say that the
terminal object 1 is a generator; that is, the category is well-pointed. (We will work
with a constructive version of well-pointedness appropriate to intuitionistic logic.)
Of course, there is a further aspect to the classical story: if we drop well-
pointedness, we can interpret BZC in any Boolean topos with an nno and choice
by using the internal logic. In [Shu18], we will extend the usual internal logic
to an interpretation we call the stack semantics that contains unbounded quanti-
fiers, enabling all the results of this paper to be carried out “internally” in non-
well-pointed categories. Other related ways to deal with unbounded quantifiers
include [JM95, ABSS14].
1.2. Some remarks on terminology. While “set theory” often refers only to
membership-based theories such as ZFC and BZC, clearly ETCS and its ilk are
also “theories about sets”, and Lawvere has observed that ETCS can serve just as
well as BZC as a foundation for much mathematics. Pursuant to this philosophy,
we will use the term material set theory for theories based on a global membership
predicate, such as BZC and ZFC, and structural set theory for theories which take
functions as fundamental, such as ETCS.
In material set theories, the elements of a set X have an independent identity,
apart from being collected together as the elements of X. Frequently, they are also
sets themselves. The adjective “material” is a suggestion of Steve Awodey [Awo96];
these are also called “membership-based” set theories.
In structural set theories, the elements of a set X have no identity independent
of X, and in particular are not sets themselves; they are merely abstract “elements”
with which we build mathematical structures. Moreover, at least in the structural
set theories we describe here, it is not meaningful to ask whether two elements
of two different sets are equal; only whether two elements of a given ambient set
are equal. Structural set theories are sometimes called “categorical”2 set theories;
we call them “structural” because they are closely aligned with the mathematical
philosophy of “structuralism” (see e.g. [McL93, Awo04]), and because although
they are usually formulated in the language of category theory, there is nothing
intrinsically necessary about that (see e.g. [S+09]).
1These “constructions” can also be expressed as logical translations from one first-order lan-
guage into another, thereby obtaining an equiconsistency result that does not depend on any
ability to “construct” new models in the metatheory. See Remark 3.8.
2To avoid conflict with other meanings of “categorical”, some people use “categorial” instead.
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As foundations for mathematics, material and structural set theory each have ad-
vantages and niches. Material set theory is well-adapted to the study of transfinite
recursion and related subjects in pure set theory. However, structural set theory is
arguably closer to mathematical practice outside of set theory, where the intricate
∈-structure of material set theory is irrelevant and objects need only be defined up
to isomorphism.3 Structural set theory is also more closely related to type theory,
and might be considered a halfway-point between a material set-theoretic founda-
tion and a type-theoretic one. The value of equivalences such as those we study
here, then, is that they enable us to use whichever foundation is most appropriate
for a given subject, with a canonical way to pass back and forth as necessary.
1.3. Summary of contents. We begin in §2 by listing some common axioms of
material set theory, most of which should be familiar. Then in §§3–7 we develop
general aspects of structural set theory. Little of this appears in the literature; the
only papers we are aware of specifically about structural set theory are Lawvere’s
original [Law64] about ETCS, and the more recent [Pal12] which presents a pred-
icative version thereof (“CETCS”), plus expository works such as [LR03, Lei14].
Our treatment is also a little idiosyncratic, due to a desire to remain isomorphism-
invariant.
We begin in §3 by setting out the formal language we will use for category
theory and recalling the basic notion of a Heyting pretopos, which underlies all our
structural set theories. In §4 we add the further axiom of well-pointedness, which
makes a Heyting pretopos into a structural set theory. Since well-pointedness has
mostly been studied in a classical setting, we spend some time on the appropriate
version thereof for a constructive theory, and its consequences. Then in §5 we
rephrase the notion of “constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos” in a way
which looks more like a set theory.
In §6 we consider three further fairly straightforward axioms—full separation,
fullness, and full induction—while in §7 we study collection and replacement axioms,
which are rather more subtle. Replacement-type axioms for ETCS have been pro-
posed by Lawvere [Law64], Cole [Col73], Osius [Osi74], and McLarty [McL04], but
none of these is really suitable intuitionistically. We begin with collection, which re-
laxes the hypothesis of replacement by not requiring uniqueness. This is well-known
to be important in weaker set theories, and its structural version is also easier to
state. The structural replacement axiom is surprisingly subtle, since uniqueness is
asserted only up to unique canonical isomorphism; we give a precise formulation of
this and show that it follows from collection.
As we introduce each axiom of structural set theory, we prove that if V is a
model of material set theory satisfying the corresponding material axiom, then the
structural axiom is satisfied by its category of sets Set(V). Not until §8 do we
turn to the reverse construction, originally due to Cole, Mitchell, and Osius, which
produces a model V(Set) of material set theory starting from a suitable pretopos
Set. As expected, we then show that if Set satisfies any given structural axiom,
V(Set) satisfies the corresponding material axiom. In particular, we conclude that
the following pairs of theories are equiconsistent:
• Lawvere’s ETCS and BZC, as in the classical theorems.
3Indeed, Bourbaki, who enshrined a structuralist philosophy in their “general theory of struc-
ture” [Bou68], had to carefully specify exactly how the superfluous data of material set theory
was to be forgotten, in order that all of their structures would be invariant under isomorphism.
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• ETCS plus our axioms of collection or replacement (which are equivalent over
ETCS and imply separation), and classical ZFC.
• “Intuitionistic ETCS” (the theory of a constructively well-pointed topos with a
nno), and “Intuitionistic BZ” (containing power sets and infinity).
• Intuitionistic ETCS plus our axioms of separation and collection, and IZF.
• The theory of a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos with a nno satisfying
our axioms of fullness, collection, and extensional well-founded induction, and
Aczel’s CZF augmented by Mostowski’s principle.
Finally, in §9 we consider the extent to which V(−) and Set(−) are inverses.
This depends on foundation-type axioms in material set theory, and on a dual class
of axioms for structural set theory that we call “materialization”.
1.4. Conventions and Notation. We treat both material and structural set the-
ories as theories in intuitionistic first-order logic (with a twist in the structural case;
see §3). We regard classical logic as an axiom schema, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for all (or some)
formulas ϕ, which may or may not be assumed in a theory or satisfied by a model.
All axioms and formulas are of course properly expressed in a formal first-order
language. However, to make the paper easier to read for non-logicians, we will
usually write such formulas out in English, trusting the reader to translate them
into formal symbols as necessary. To make it clear when our mathematical English
is to be interpreted as code for a logical formula, we will often use sans serif font
and corner quotes. Thus, for example, in a structural set theory, pevery surjection
has a sectionq represents the axiom of choice.
1.5. Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Steve Awodey, Toby Bartels,
Peter Lumsdaine, Colin McLarty, Thomas Streicher, Paul Taylor, and the patrons
of the n-Category Cafe´ for many helpful conversations and useful comments on
early drafts of this paper. The referee of the preliminary version also gave many
helpful suggestions.
2. Material set theories
Our material set theories will be theories in one-sorted first order logic, with a
single binary relation symbol ∈, whose variables are called sets. (We will briefly
mention the possibility of “atoms” which are not sets at the end of this section.)
Notation 2.1. There are two common conventions regarding the treatment of
free variables in logical formulas. According to one convention, we should write
ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) to indicate that all the free variables of ϕ are among x1, . . . , xn, and
then write ϕ(a1, . . . , an) for the result of substituting each ai for the corresponding
xi. According to the other convention, in the first case we write ϕ without notating
the free variables, and then ϕ[a1/x1, . . . , an/xn] for the result of substitution.
The former convention has the advantage of an easy and intuitive notation for
substitution, plus explicit indication of the free variables. The latter convention is
cleaner if there are many free variables but only a few are being substituted for.
We choose a convention that borrows something from both standard ones. By a
context we mean a finite list Γ = (x1, . . . , xn) of distinct variables. (This definition
will change slightly in the next section, where we use a typed logic.) A formula
ϕ, written with no variables indicated, is said to be in context Γ if all of its free
variables are found in Γ. However, we say a formula written as ϕ(x, y) (for instance)
is in context Γ if all of its free variables other than x and y are found in Γ (and
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x and y do not appear in Γ). This convention allows us to carry around many
free variables with unchanging values without needing to notate them constantly,
yet retains a convenient notation indicating those free variables whose values do
change.
In particular, this convention simplifies the statements of many of the axioms
below. In all axiom schemas which are parameterized over a formula ϕ, ϕ(x), or
ϕ(x, y), we assume this formula to exist in an ambient context Γ, whose variables
are implicitly universally quantified outside each instance of the schema.
Definition 2.2. In material set theory, a ∆0-quantifier is one of the form
• (∃x)(x ∈ a ∧ · · · ), abbreviated (∃x ∈ a); or
• (∀x)(x ∈ a⇒ · · · ), abbreviated (∀x ∈ a).
A ∆0-formula (also called restricted or bounded) is one with only ∆0-quantifiers.
The prefix “∆0-” on any axiom schema indicates that the formulas appearing
in it are restricted to be ∆0; we sometimes use the adjective “full” to indicate the
lack of any such restriction.
Definition 2.3.
• We write { x | ϕ(x) } for a set a such that x ∈ a⇔ ϕ(x), if such a set exists.
• A relation from a to b is a set r of ordered pairs (x, y) such that x ∈ a and
y ∈ b, where (x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}.4
• A relation r from a to b is entire (or a many-valued function) if for all x ∈ a
there exists y ∈ b with (x, y) ∈ r. If each such y is unique, r is a function.
• A relation r is bi-entire if both r and ro = { (y, x) | (x, y) ∈ r } are entire.
The following set of axioms (in intuitionistic logic) we call the core axioms;
they form a subsystem of basically all material set theories.
• Extensionality : pfor any x and y, x = y if and only if for all z, z ∈ x iff z ∈ yq.
• Empty set: pthe set ∅ = {} existsq.
• Pairing: pfor any x and y, the set {x, y} existsq.
• Union: pfor any x, the set { z | (∃y ∈ x)(z ∈ y) } existsq.
• ∆0-Separation: For any ∆0-formula ϕ(x), pfor any a, { x ∈ a | ϕ(x) } existsq.
• Limited ∆0-replacement : For any ∆0-formula ϕ(x, y), pfor all a and b, if for every
x ∈ a there exists a unique y with ϕ(x, y), and moreover z ⊆ b for all z ∈ y, then
the set { y | (∃x ∈ a)ϕ(x, y) } existsq.
The first five of these are standard, while the last, though very weak, is unusual.
We include it because we want our core axioms to imply a well-behaved category of
sets, for which purpose the other five are not quite enough. This axiom is satisfied in
basically all material set theories, since it is implied both by ordinary replacement
(even ∆0-replacement), and by the existence of power sets (using ∆0-separation).
We now list some additional common and important axioms of material set
theory, pointing out the most important implications between them.
One major axis along which set theories vary is “impredicativity,” expressed by
the following sequence of axioms (of increasing strength):
• Exponentiation: pfor any a and b, the set ba of all functions from a to b existsq.
4It is straightforward to prove that this Kuratowski definition of ordered pairs still has the
correct behavior intuitionistically; see for instance [AR01].
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• Fullness: pfor any a, b there exists a set m of entire relations from a to b such that
for any entire relation f from a to b, there is a g ∈ m with g ⊆ fq.
• Power set: pfor any set x, the set Px = { y | y ⊆ x } existsq.
Each of these is strictly stronger than the preceding one, but in the presence of
either of the following:
• ∆0-classical logic: for any ∆0-formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
• Full classical logic: for any formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
the hierarchy of predicativity collapses, since power sets can then be obtained (us-
ing limited ∆0-replacement) from sets of functions into a 2-element set. Hence
the combination of classical logic with exponentiation is also impredicative. Also
considered impredicative is:
• (Full) Separation: For any formula ϕ(x), pfor any a, { x ∈ a | ϕ(x) } existsq.
Full separation and ∆0-classical logic together imply full classical logic, since we
can form a = { ∅ | ϕ } ⊆ { ∅ }, and then (∅ ∈ a) ∨ (∅ 6∈ a) is an instance of ∆0-
classical logic that implies ϕ∨¬ϕ. A similar argument shows that ∆0-classical logic
is equivalent to the assertion that every subset has a complement.
We also have the collection and replacement axioms. Our collection axiom is
often called “Strong Collection”.
• Collection: for any formula ϕ(x, y), pfor any a, if for all x ∈ a there is a y with
ϕ(x, y), then there is a b such that for all x ∈ a, there is a y ∈ b with ϕ(x, y), and
for all y ∈ b, there is a x ∈ a with ϕ(x, y)q.
• Replacement: for any formula ϕ(x, y), pfor any a, if for every x ∈ a there exists a
unique y with ϕ(x, y), then the set { y | (∃x ∈ a)ϕ(x, y) } existsq.
With an evident extension of Definition 2.3 to formulas, we can state the collection
axiom as “if ϕ is entire on a, then there exists b such that ϕ is bi-entire from a
to b.” Collection also evidently implies replacement. Classical ZF set theory is
often defined using replacement rather than collection, but in the presence of the
other axioms of ZF, collection can be proven. (Replacement and full classical logic
together also imply full separation.) This is no longer true in intuitionistic logic,
though, or in classical logic without the axiom of foundation, and in practice the
extra strength of collection is sometimes important. There are also other versions
of collection, all of which are equivalent in the presence of full separation, but the
one we have chosen seems most appropriate in its absence.
We consider only the version of the axiom of infinity which asserts the existence
of the set ω of finite von Neumann ordinals.
• (von Neumann) Infinity: pthere exists a set ω such that ∅ ∈ ω, if x ∈ ω then
x∪{x} ∈ ω, and if z is any other set such that ∅ ∈ z and if x ∈ z then x∪{x} ∈ z,
then ω ⊆ zq.
We can omit the final clause in this axiom in the presence of power sets or full
separation, since it can be recovered by replacing ω with its smallest subset con-
taining ∅ and closed under successor x 7→ x ∪ {x}. But otherwise we need to
include this clause explicitly, in order to prove that mathematical induction holds
for ∆0-formulas. For a stronger version of induction, we need a separate axiom.
• (Full) Induction: for any formula ϕ(x), pif ϕ(∅) and ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(x ∪ {x}) for any
x ∈ ω, then ϕ(x) for all x ∈ ωq.
Of course, infinity plus full separation implies full induction.
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There are also various axioms of choice; we will consider only the following two.
• Choice: pfor any set a, if for all x ∈ a there exists a y ∈ x, then there exists a
function f from a to
⋃
a such that f(x) ∈ x for all x ∈ aq.
• Presentation: pFor every set a, there exists a surjection b → a, where b has the
property that any surjection c→ b has a section.q
By Diaconescu’s argument [Dia75], choice and power set together imply ∆0-classical
logic. A set b as in the presentation axiom is called projective; thus the presenta-
tion axiom is also called “EPSets” (Enough Projective Sets) or “COSHEP” (the
Category Of Sets Has Enough Projectives). It implies countable dependent choice.
Finally, we have the family of “foundation-type” axioms. Recall that a set x is
called transitive if z ∈ y ∈ x implies z ∈ x. A set X with a binary relation≺ is called
well-founded if whenever Y ⊆ X is inductive, in the sense that (∀y ≺ x)(y ∈ Y )
implies x ∈ Y , then in fact Y = X. It is extensional if (∀z ∈ X)(z ≺ x ⇔ z ≺ y)
implies x = y.
• Set-induction: for any formula ϕ(x), pif for any set y, ϕ(x) for all x ∈ y implies
ϕ(y), then ϕ(x) for any set xq.
• Foundation, a.k.a. ∆0-set-induction: like set-induction, but only for ∆0-formulas.
• Transitive closures: pevery set is a subset of a smallest transitive setq.
• Mostowski’s principle: pevery well-founded extensional relation is isomorphic to a
transitive set equipped with the relation ∈q.
The usual “classical” formulation of foundation is
• Regularity: pif x is nonempty, there is some y ∈ x such that x ∩ y = ∅q.
In the presence of transitive closures, regularity is equivalent to the conjunction of
∆0-set-induction and ∆0-classical logic. Thus, in an intuitionistic theory, ∆0-set-
induction is preferable. Of course, ∆0-set-induction follows from full set-induction,
while the converse is true if we have full separation. Set-induction also implies full
ordinary induction, since < and ∈ are the same for von Neumann ordinals.
Transitive closures can be constructed either from set-induction and replace-
ment (see [AR01]), or from infinity, ordinary (full) induction, and replacement.
Mostowski’s original proof shows that his principle follows from replacement and
full separation. Transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle are not usually con-
sidered “foundation” axioms, but we group them thusly for several reasons:
• The conjunction of transitive closures, Mostowski’s principle, and foundation is
equivalent to the single statement “to give a set is the same as to give a well-
founded extensional relation with a specified element.” One could argue that
this sums up the objects of study of well-founded material set theory.
• As we will see in §8, it follows that the (well-founded) material set theories that
can be constructed from structural ones are precisely those which satisfy these
three axioms.
• Finally, the various axioms of anti-foundation are also naturally stated as “to
give a set is the same as to give a (blank) relation with a specified element,”
where (blank) denotes some stronger type of extensionality (there are several
choices; see [Acz88]). Thus, these axioms naturally include analogues not just
of foundation, but also of transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle.
Similar groupings can be found in, for instance, [ABSS14] and [Mat01].
Some particular material set theories with names include the following. Note
that in this context, the prefix constructive is generally reserved for “predicative”
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theories (including, potentially, exponentiation and fullness, but never power sets or
full separation) while intuitionistic refers to “impredicative” (but still non-classical)
theories which may have power sets or full separation. None of these theories include
our axiom of limited ∆0-replacement explicitly, but all include either power sets or
a stronger version of replacement, both of which imply it.
• The standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC) includes
all the axioms mentioned above, although it suffices to assume the core axioms
together with full classical logic, power sets, replacement, infinity, foundation,
and choice.
• By Zermelo set theory (Z) one usually means the core axioms together with
full classical logic, power sets, full separation, and infinity.
• The theory ZBQC of [ML86], called RZC in [MLM94, VI.10] and BZC else-
where, consists of the core axioms together with full classical logic, power sets,
infinity, choice, and regularity.
• By Intuitionistic BZ we will mean the core axioms together with power sets,
infinity, and foundation.
• The Mostowski set theory (MOST) of [Mat01] consists of ZBQC together
with transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle.
• By Kripke-Platek set theory (KP) is usually meant the core axioms together
with full classical logic, a form of ∆0-collection (sufficient to imply our limited
∆0-replacement), and set-induction for some class of formulas.
• The theory ZFC− of [GHJ11] consists of the core axioms together with full clas-
sical logic, infinity, foundation, choice, and replacement (the “sufficient axioms”
listed above for ZFC, with power sets removed), while their ZFC− has collection
instead of replacement. (Actually, they use a version of choice that is stronger
than ours in the absence of power sets, but is unsuitable intuitionistically.)
• Aczel’s Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel (CZF) consists of the core axioms
together with fullness, collection, infinity, and set-induction; see [AR01]. His
CZF0 consists of the core axioms, replacement, infinity, and induction.
• The usual meaning of Intuitionistic Zermelo-Fraenkel (IZF) is the core
axioms together with power sets, full separation, collection, infinity, and set-
induction. This is the strongest theory that can be built from the above axioms
without any form of classical logic or choice.
• The Rudimentary Set Theory (RST) of [vdBM07] consists of the core ax-
ioms together with collection and set-induction.
So far we have considered only theories of pure sets, i.e. in which everything is
a set. If we want to also allow “atoms” or “urelements” which are not sets, we can
modify any of the above theories by adding a predicate px is a setq, whose negation
is read as px is an atomq. We must then add the following axiom:
• Only sets have elements: pif x ∈ y, then y is a setq.
and modify the extensionality axiom so that it applies only to sets:
• Extensionality for sets: pfor any sets x and y, x = y if and only if for all z, z ∈ x
iff z ∈ yq.
We may choose whether or not to add the following axioms:
• Decidability of sethood: pevery x is either a set or an atomq.
• Set of atoms: pthe set { x | x is an atom } existsq.
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as well as whether to allow the predicate px is a setq to appear in the formulas that
parameterize the axiom schemas. For instance:
• The theory IZFA of [JM95] consists of IZF, as above, with atoms and decidable
sethood, and does allow sethood in axiom schemas.
• If ZFA has a standard meaning, it is probably IZFA plus full classical logic.
• The Basic Constructive Set Theory (BCST) of [AW06, AFW06] consists
of the core axioms together with replacement, with atoms. Their Constructive
Set Theory (CST) adds exponentials to this, and the Basic Intuitionistic
Set Theory (BIST) of [AF06, AFW06, ABSS07, ABSS14] adds power sets and
a non-von-Neumann version of infinity. These theories do not assume decidabil-
ity of sethood or a set of atoms, and do not allow sethood in axiom schemas.
• The theory BIZFA of [ABSS14] consists of BIST, as above, together with decid-
able sethood, foundation, transitive closures, and Mostowski’s principle (suitably
modified for the existence of atoms), and does allow sethood in axiom schemas.
3. Heyting pretoposes
We now move on to structural set theories, beginning with the underlying logic.
The theory of a category can, of course, be formulated in ordinary first-order
logic, but this is unsatisfactory to us because it allows us to discuss equality of
objects. However, we cannot simply remove the equality predicate on objects
from the ordinary first-order theory, because sometimes we do need to know that
two objects are the same. For example, to compose two arrows f and g, we
need to know that the source of g is the same as the target of f . The solution
(c.f. [Fre76, Bla79, Mak95, Mak01]) is to use a language of dependent types. We
give here a somewhat informal description in an attempt to avoid the complicated
precise syntax of dependent type theory, but the reader familiar with DTT should
easily be able to expand our description into a formal one.
Definition 3.1. The language of categories consists of the following.
(i) There is a type of objects. By an object-variable we mean a variable that has
been assigned to the type of objects.
(ii) Each object-variable is, in particular, an object-term.
(iii) For object-terms X and Y , there is a type X → Y of arrows from X to Y .
By an arrow-variable we mean a variable that has been assigned to some type
of arrows (which entails specifying the object-terms X and Y ).
(iv) Every arrow-variable is, in particular, an arrow-term. Like arrow-variables,
every arrow-term is assigned to a particular type of arrows.
(v) For each object-term X, there is an arrow-term 1X : X → X.
(vi) For any object-terms X, Y , and Z and each pair of arrow-terms f : X → Y
and g : Y → Z, there is an arrow-term (g ◦ f) : X → Z.
(vii) For any arrow-terms f, g : X → Y , there is an atomic formula (f = g).
Non-atomic formulas are built up from atomic ones in the usual way, using connec-
tives >, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ⇒, ¬, and quantifiers ∃ and ∀. There are of course two types of
quantifiers, for object-variables and for arrow-variables; the former is restricted in
that we may not quantify over an object-variable if it appears in the type of any
free arrow-variable.
Of course, this theory uses very little of the full machinery of DTT, and in
particular it may be said to live in the “first-order” fragment of DTT. In this way
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it is closely related to the logic FOLDS studied in [Mak95], although we are allowing
some term constructors in addition to relations.
Notation 3.2. We will use the same notational convention for free variables as in
Notation 2.1, but adapted appropriately for dependent type theory. In particular,
by a context in this language, we mean a finite (ordered) list Γ of typed variables,
with the property that whenever an arrow-variable f : X → Y occurs in Γ, each of
X and Y is an object-variable occurring in Γ prior to f . If Θ is a further list of
typed variables which is an extension of Γ, in the sense that the concatenation
(Γ,Θ) is a context, then we say that a formula written ϕ(Θ) is in context Γ if all
its free variables are in (Γ,Θ).
Thus, for instance, Γ = (X,Y, f : X → Y ) is a context, and if g : X → Y is
a further arrow-variable, then a formula whose free variables are among X,Y, f, g
may be denoted ϕ(g) in context Γ.
Definition 3.3. Let A be a category, Γ a context, and let ρ be a well-typed
assignment of the variables in Γ to objects and morphisms of A. We denote this by
ρ : Γ→ A. Then the satisfaction relation A ρ ϕ is defined as usual, by induction
on the structure of ϕ. If ρ is obvious from context, we omit it from the notation.
The main thing to note about this language is that, as in FOLDS, the only
atomic formulas are equalities between parallel arrows; the language does not allow
us to even discuss whether two objects are equal. (However, we do still assume
the usual rules of equality for equalities of arrows, such as substitution, reflexivity,
symmetry, and transitivity.) This implies that satisfaction is isomorphism- and
equivalence-invariant, in the following sense.
First, suppose ρ, ρ′ : Γ→ A. By definition, an isomorphism ρ ∼= ρ′ consists of
an isomorphism ρ(X) ∼= ρ′(X) for each object-variable X ∈ Γ, such that for every
arrow-variable f : X → Y in Γ, the following square commutes:
ρ(X)
ρ(f)
//
∼=

ρ(Y )
∼=

ρ′(X)
ρ′(f)
// ρ′(Y ).
Lemma 3.4 (Isomorphism-invariance of truth). If ρ ∼= ρ′ as above, and ϕ is a
formula in context Γ, then A ρ ϕ if and only if A ρ′ ϕ. 
Second, if F : A→ B is a functor and ρ : Γ→ A, we write F ◦ ρ : Γ→ B for the
assignment determined by (F ◦ ρ)(X) = F (ρ(X)) and (F ◦ ρ)(f) = F (ρ(f)).
Lemma 3.5 (Equivalence-invariance of truth). If ϕ is a formula in context Γ, and
the functor F , as above, is fully faithful and essentially surjective, then A ρ ϕ if
and only if B F◦ρ ϕ. 
Both of these lemmas are proven by straightforward induction on the structure
of ϕ. (In fact, the dependently typed theory of categories characterizes exactly
those properties of categories which are invariant under equivalence in this sense;
see [Bla79, Fre76, Mak95].)
We now list the basic category-theoretic properties we will consider. First of all,
we must have a category, so we include:
• Identity: pfor all X,Y , and f : X → Y , we have 1Y ◦ f = f = f ◦ 1Xq.
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• Associativity: pfor all X,Y, Z,W and f : X → Y , g : Y → Z, and h : Z →W , we
have h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ fq.
Recall that a Heyting category is a category satisfying the following axioms.
• Finite limits: pthere exists a terminal object, binary products, and equalizersq.
• Regularity: pevery morphism factors as a regular epi followed by a mono, and regular
epis are stable under pullbackq.
• Coherency: pfinite unions of subobjects exist and are stable under pullbackq.
• Dual images: pfor any f : X → Y , the pullback functor f∗ : Sub(Y ) → Sub(X)
has a right adjoint ∀fq.
Of course, a statement such as pbinary products existq actually means
pfor all X,Y , there exists W and p : W → X, q : W → Y such that
for any T and a : T → X, b : T → Y , there exists h : T → W such
that a = p ◦ h and b = q ◦ h, and for any k : T → W such that
a = p ◦ k and b = q ◦ k, we have h = kq.
The notation Sub(X) denotes the poset of subobjects of X, i.e. of monomorphisms
into X modulo isomorphism. In order to remain first-order, the axiom of dual
images should be interpreted as asserting the existence of each individual value of
∀f with its universal property, i.e.
pfor any f : X → Y , and any monomorphism m : A → X, there
exists a monomorphism n : B → Y such that for any monomorphism
q : C → Y , we have that q factors through n if and only if there exists
a pullback of q along f which factors through mq.
A Heyting category is called a Heyting pretopos if it also satisfies:
• Positivity/extensivity: pthere exist binary coproducts which are disjoint and pullback-
stableq.
• Exactness: pevery equivalence relation is a kernelq.
It is a Π-pretopos if it also satisfies:
• Local cartesian closure: pfor every arrow f : X → Y , the pullback functor f∗ : S/Y →
S/X has a right adjoint Πfq
Finally, if it additionally satisfies:
• Power objects: pevery object X has a power object PXq
(which, together with finite limits, implies all the other axioms of a Π-pretopos) it
is called an (elementary) topos. See, e.g., [Joh02, §A.1] for more details.
In a pretopos, every mono and every epi is regular, and thus it is balanced (every
monic epic is an isomorphism). Furthermore, the self-indexing of any pretopos is a
stack for its coherent topology. Of course, first-order versions of these statements
can be proven, in the language of categories, from the above axioms.
Remark 3.6. Since all of our axioms are formulated in first-order logic, all the
categorical operations such as finite limits, exponentials, etc. are expressed as pure
existence statements. Strictly speaking this means that notation such as “A× B”
or “XY ” is an abuse, since we have no product or exponential operations (and we
are not assuming any axiom of choice allowing us to construct such operations).
However, such abuses are standard in mathematics and cause no problems; formally
they are little different from the notation { x | ϕ(x) } in material set theory, whose
separation axioms are also formally expressed as pure existence statements. In fact,
we could make this precise by extending our language to include such operations on
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terms and proving formally that it can still be interpreted in categories satisfying
only the pure existence axioms (thereby moving in the direction of type theory),
but we leave this to the interested reader.
Some other important axioms are the following:
• Booleanness: pevery subobject has a complementq.
• Full classical logic: for any formula ϕ, we have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ.
• Infinity: pthere exists a natural number object (nno)q.
• Choice: pevery regular epimorphism splitsq.
• Enough projectives: pEvery object admits a regular epimorphism from an object
which is projective with respect to regular epimorphisms.q
(In the absence of cartesian closure, the definition of an nno should be taken with
arbitrary parameters; see [Joh02, A2.5.3]. On the other hand, since every epi is
regular in a pretopos, we can omit any occurrences of the adjective “regular”.)
Each of the above axioms (beyond those of a Heyting pretopos) is, more or less
obviously, a counterpart of some axiom of material set theory. This is perhaps least
obvious in the case of Booleanness, which we regard as a structural counterpart
of ∆0-classical logic. However, in §2 we observed that in material set theory, ∆0-
classical logic is equivalent to the assertion that every subset has a complement.
See also Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 5.2.
We end this section by observing that each material axiom implies its corre-
sponding structural axiom for the category of sets.
Theorem 3.7. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, then the sets
and functions in V form a Heyting pretopos Set(V). Moreover:
(i) If V satisfies exponentiation, then Set(V) is locally cartesian closed.
(ii) If V satisfies the power set axiom, then Set(V) is a topos.
(iii) If V satisfies ∆0-classical logic, then Set(V) is Boolean.
(iv) If V satisfies full classical logic, so does Set(V).
(v) If V satisfies infinity and exponentials, then Set(V) has a nno.
(vi) If V satisfies the presentation axiom, then Set(V) has enough projectives.
(vii) If V satisfies the axiom of choice, then so does Set(V).
Proof. We first show that Set(V) is a category. Using pairing and limited ∆0-
replacement, we can form, for any set a and any x ∈ a, the set pa,x of all pairs
{x, y} for y ∈ a. Again using limited ∆0-replacement, we can form the set of all the
pa,x for x ∈ a, and take its union, thereby obtaining the set of all pairs {x, y} for
x, y ∈ a. Applying this construction twice to a ∪ b = ⋃{a, b}, we can then use ∆0-
separation to cut out the set a×b of Kuratowski ordered pairs (x, y) = {{x}, {x, y}}
where x ∈ a and y ∈ b. With this in hand we can define function composition and
identities using ∆0-separation.
Finite limits are straightforward: we already have products, {∅} is a terminal
object, and ∆0-separation supplies equalizers. The construction of pullback-stable
images, unions, and dual images is also easy from ∆0-separation. A stable and
disjoint coproduct a + b can as usual be obtained as a subset of {0, 1} × (a ∪ b).
And if r ⊆ a× a is an equivalence relation, ∆0-separation supplies the equivalence
class of any x ∈ a, and limited ∆0-replacement then supplies the set of all such
equivalence classes.
Exponentiation clearly implies cartesian closedness. For local cartesian closed-
ness, suppose given f : a → b and g : x → a. Then the fiber of Πf (g) → b over
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j ∈ b should be the set of all functions s : f−1(j) → x such that g ◦ s = 1f−1(j);
this can be cut out of xf
−1(j) by ∆0-separation. Finally, the entire set Πf (g) can
be constructed from these and limited ∆0-replacement, since each element of each
fiber is a subset of a× x.
The relationship between power sets and power objects is analogous. We have
just recalled that ∆0-classical logic implies every subset has a complement, and the
implication for full classical logic is evident.
Now suppose that V satisfies infinity and exponentials, and let ω be as in the
axiom of infinity; we define 0 ∈ ω and s : ω → ω in the obvious way. Suppose
given A
g−→ B t←− B; we must construct a unique function f : A × ω → B such
that f(1A × 0) = gpi1 and f(1A × s) = tf . Let R = { (a, b) ∈ ω × ω | a ∈ b } with
projection pi2 : R → ω, and let X be the exponential (B × ω → ω)(A×R→ω) in
Set/ω; thus an element of X is equivalent to an n ∈ ω together with a function
f : A × {m | m ∈ n } → B. Using ∆0-separation, we have the subset Y ⊆ X
of those f ∈ X such that f(a, 0) = g(a) and f(a, s(m)) = t(f(a,m)) whenever
s(m) ∈ n. We then prove by induction that for all n ∈ ω there exists an f ∈ Y
with n ∈ dom(f) and that for any two such f, f ′ we have f(n) = f ′(n). The union
of Y is then the desired function.
The presentation axiom, of course, is literally the statement that Set(V) has
enough projectives. And finally, if V satisfies choice, then from any surjection
p : e→ b we can construct, using limited ∆0-replacement, the set
{
p−1(x)
∣∣ x ∈ b },
and applying the material axiom of choice to this gives a section of p. 
Remark 3.8. We have stated Theorem 3.7 in the form “given a model of material
set theory, we can construct a category with certain properties” because we find it
easiest to conceptualize in that way. Of course, this requires the model of material
set theory to exist in some ambient world in which we can perform this construction.
A more elementary way to interpret this “construction” is as giving a way to
translate a formula ϕ in the language of category theory into a formula in the
language of material set theory, by simply writing down what the assertion “ϕ
holds in the category of sets” would mean in terms of the basic notions of set
theory. The content of the theorem then becomes that if we assume certain axioms
of material set theory, then the translations of certain category-theoretic axioms are
provable—and therefore, so is any consequence of those axioms. (This is equivalent
to performing the above model-theoretic construction with the generic model of a
material set theory in its syntactic category.) In this way we can obtain a relative
consistency result with the weakest possible metatheoretic assumptions. This same
sort of interpretation will also be possible for the reverse construction in §8.
Remark 3.9. The proof of Theorem 3.7 is unaffected by the possible presence of
atoms in V. This will remain true for the theorems in later sections giving similar
correspondences for the other axioms.
4. Constructive well-pointedness
In §3 we considered only standard category-theoretic properties, but not every
Heyting pretopos deserves to be called a model of structural set theory. The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of a set, as opposed to an object of some more general
category, is that a set is determined by its elements and nothing more. This is
expressed by the following property.
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Definition 4.1. A Heyting category S is constructively well-pointed if it sat-
isfies the following (in which 1 refers to a terminal object).
(a) If m : A  X is monic and every 1 x−→ X factors through m, then m is an
isomorphism (1 is a strong generator).
(b) Every regular epimorphism X  1 splits (1 is projective).
(c) If 1 is expressed as the union of two subobjects 1 = A ∪B, then either A or B
must be isomorphic to 1 (1 is indecomposable).
(d) There does not exist a map 1→ 0 (1 is nonempty).
Remark 4.2. Of course, since regular epis are stable under pullback, 1 is projective
if and only if for any regular epi Y
p−− X, every global element 1→ X lifts to Y .
Likewise, since unions are stable under pullback, 1 is indecomposable if and only if
whenever X = A∪B, every global element 1→ X factors through either A or B. In
particular, if S is locally small in some external set theory, then S is constructively
well-pointed if and only if S(1,−) : S→ Set is a conservative coherent functor.
We immediately record the following.
Proposition 4.3. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, then Set(V)
is constructively well-pointed.
Proof. Functions 1→ X in Set(V) are in canonical correspondence with elements
of X, and a function is monic just when it is injective. Thus, if m is monic and every
map from 1 factors through it, then it must be bijective, and hence an isomorphism;
thus 1 is a strong generator. Next, the epics in Set(V) are the surjections, and if
X
p−− 1 is a surjection, then X must be inhabited, hence p splits. And if 1 = A∪B,
then the unique element of 1 must be in either A or B by definition of unions, hence
either A or B must be inhabited. Finally, ∅ has no elements, so 1 is nonempty. 
Recall that classically, a topos is said to be well-pointed if 1 is a generator (i.e.
for f, g : X ⇒ Y , having fx = gx for all 1 x−→ X implies f = g) and there is
no map 1 → 0 (1 is nonempty). Thus, any constructively well-pointed topos is
well-pointed in the classical sense. Conversely, the following is well-known (see, for
instance, [MLM94, VI.1 and VI.10]).
Lemma 4.4. Let S be a Heyting category satisfying full classical logic, and in
which 1 is a nonempty strong generator. Then S is Boolean and constructively
well-pointed.
Proof. For any object X, either X is initial or it isn’t. If it isn’t, then there must be
a global element 1→ X, since otherwise the monic 0 X would be an isomorphism
(since 1 is a strong generator). Therefore, if X is not initial, then X → 1 is split
epic. Now suppose that X is any object such that X → 1 is regular epic; since
0 → 1 is not regular epic, it follows that X is not initial, and so X → 1 must in
fact be split epic; thus 1 is projective. Also, if 1 = A ∪ B, then A and B cannot
both be initial, so one of them has a global element; thus 1 is indecomposable.
Now let A X be a subobject and assume that A ∪ ¬A is not all of X. Then
since 1 is a strong generator, there is a 1
x−→ X not factoring through A ∪ ¬A.
Let V = x∗(A ∪ ¬A). Then V is a subobject of 1. If V is not initial, then it has
a global element and hence is all of 1, so x factors through A ∪ ¬A. But if V is
initial, then x∗(A) must also be initial, which implies that x factors through ¬A.
This is a contradiction, so A ∪ ¬A = X; hence S is Boolean. 
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Corollary 4.5. Let S be a topos satisfying full classical logic, which is well-pointed
in the classical sense. Then S is Boolean and constructively well-pointed.
Proof. In a topos, any generator is a strong generator. 
Thus, in the presence of full classical logic, our notion of constructive well-
pointedness is equivalent to the usual notion of well-pointedness. However, Propo-
sition 4.3 shows that a constructively well-pointed topos not satisfying full classical
logic need not be Boolean. One can also construct examples showing that in the
absence of full classical logic, a Boolean topos in which 1 is a nonempty generator
need not be constructively well-pointed. It is true, however, even intuitionistically,
that if 1 is projective, indecomposable, and nonempty in a Boolean topos, it must
also be a generator; see [Awo97, V.3].
Remark 4.6. Other authors have also recognized the importance of explicitly assum-
ing projectivity and indecomposability of 1 in an intuitionistic context. In [Awo97] a
topos in which 1 is projective, indecomposable, and nonempty was called hyperlocal
(but in [Joh92, Joh02] that word is used for a stronger, non-elementary, property).
And in [Pal12], indecomposability of 1 is assumed explicitly, while projectivity of 1
is deduced from a factorization axiom. It is also worth noting that in an ambient
classical logic, a Grothendieck topos is local, in the geometric sense that its global
sections functor S(1,−) : S → Set has a right adjoint, if and only if 1 ∈ S is
projective, indecomposable, and nonempty. See [SST+17].
We note that most classical properties of a well-pointed topos make use of projec-
tivity and indecomposability of 1, and many of these are still true intuitionistically
as long as the category is constructively well-pointed.
Lemma 4.7. Let S be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category. Then:
(i) A morphism p : Y → X is regular epic if and only if every map 1→ X factors
through it.
(ii) Likewise, f : Y → X is monic if and only if every map 1→ X factors through
it in at most one way, and an isomorphism if and only if every map 1 → X
factors through it uniquely.
(iii) Given two subobjects A  X and B  X, we have A ≤ B if and only if
every map 1→ X which factors through A also factors through B.
(iv) X is initial if and only if there does not exist any morphism 1→ X.
Proof. The “only if” part of (i) follows because 1 is projective. For the “if” part,
note that a map p : Y → X in a regular category is regular epic iff its image is all
of X, while if every 1→ X factors through p then it must factor through im(p) as
well; hence im(p) is all of X since 1 is a strong generator.
The “only if” parts of (ii) are obvious. If f : Y → X is injective on global
elements, then the canonical monomorphism Y → Y ×X Y is bijective on global
elements, and hence an isomorphism; thus Y is monic. And if f is bijective on
global elements, then by this and by (i) it must be both monic and regular epic,
hence an isomorphism.
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The “only if” part of (iii) is also obvious. If every 1→ X which factors through
A also factors through B, then in the pullback
A ∩B //

B

A // X
the map A ∩B → A must be an isomorphism, since 1 is a strong generator; hence
its inverse provides a factorization of A through B.
Finally, the “only if” part of (iv) is nonemptiness, while if X has no global
elements, the map 0→ X is bijective on global elements, hence an isomorphism. 
In particular, it follows that for constructively well-pointed categories, Boolean-
ness coincides with “two-valued-ness”:
Lemma 4.8. Let S be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category; the following
are equivalent.
(i) S is Boolean.
(ii) Every subterminal object is either terminal or initial.
Proof. Assuming (i), if A is subterminal, then for its Heyting complement ¬A we
have A∪¬A ∼= 1. By indecomposability of 1, it follows that either A is terminal or
¬A is terminal, and the latter implies that A is initial.
Conversely, assuming (ii), let A  X be a monomorphism and ¬A  X its
Heyting complement. Since 1 is a strong generator, to show A∪¬A ∼= X it suffices
to show every x : 1 → X factors through A or ¬A. But given x, the pullback
x∗(A) is subterminal, hence either terminal or initial. In the former case, x factors
through A; while in the latter case it factors through ¬A. 
Remark 4.9. In terms of the internal logic, indecomposability of 1 corresponds to
the disjunction property (if ϕ ∨ ψ is true, then either ϕ is true or ψ is true), while
projectivity of 1 corresponds to the existence property (if (∃x)ϕ(x) is true, then
there is a particular a such that ϕ(a) is true). We might also call nonemptiness of
1 the negation property (⊥ is not true).
By a structural set theory, we will informally mean an extension of the axiomatic
theory describing a constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos. Not many struc-
tural set theories have been given particular names, but here are a few.
• Lawvere’s Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS), defined
in [Law64], is the theory of a well-pointed topos with a nno satisfying full
classical logic and the axiom of choice.
• Palmgren’s Constructive ETCS (CETCS), defined in [Pal12], is the theory
of a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos with a nno and enough projectives.
• We will refer to the theory of a constructively well-pointed topos with a nno as
Intuitionistic ETCS (IETCS).
5. Structural set theory as set theory
So far, we have expressed the axioms of structural set theory in a form familiar
to category theorists. However, they can equivalently be formulated in a much
more “set-theoretic” way, as was done in [Law64]. Besides its intrinsic interest, this
reformulation facilitates the comparison with material set theories.
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First of all, we formulate a structural counterpart of the notion of ∆0-formula.
For simplicity, we henceforth extend our language with a particular object-term
“1”, and modify the terminal-object axiom to assert simply that p1 is terminalq.
Now we define:
• An arrow-variable x : 1→ X whose domain is 1 is a ∆0-variable.
• A context containing only ∆0-variables is a ∆0-context.
• An equality (f = g) of arrow-terms f, g : 1 → X with source 1 is a ∆0-atomic
formula.
• A quantifier over a ∆0-variable is a ∆0-quantifier.
• A formula whose only atomic subformulas are ∆0-atomic and whose only quan-
tifiers are ∆0-quantifiers is a ∆0-formula.
Note that a ∆0-formula may contain non-∆0 free variables. We can now reformulate
the basic structure of a Heyting category as a separation axiom.
Proposition 5.1. Let S be a category with finite limits in which 1 is a strong
generator. Then the following are equivalent.
(i) S is a constructively well-pointed Heyting category.
(ii) S satisfies the schema of ∆0-separation: for any ∆0-formula ϕ(x) with
free ∆0-variable x : 1→ X, pthere exists a subobject S  X such that any
map x : 1→ X factors through S if and only if ϕ(x) holdsq.
Proof. First we assume (i) and prove (ii). As usual, in (ii) we are allowing ϕ to
exist in an arbitrary context Γ, and the variables occurring in Γ are not restricted
to be ∆0. To make the induction go through, we prove a more general statement.
In addition to an arbitrary context Γ, we suppose Θ to be a ∆0-extension of Γ (that
is, Θ consists of ∆0-variables and (Γ,Θ) is a context).
Let ρ : Γ→ S be a variable assignment, and let ρ(Θ) denote the product in S of
the images under ρ of the codomains of all the ∆0-variables in Θ. For example, if
Θ = (x : 1→ X, y : 1→ Y ), then ρ(Θ) = ρ(X)×ρ(Y ). (If S does not have assigned
products, we simply chose some such product.) Let ϕ(Θ) be a formula in context Γ;
we will prove, by structural induction on ϕ, that there exists a subobject S  ρ(Θ)
such that t : 1→ ρ(Θ) factors through S if and only if ϕ(t) holds. This implies (ii)
by taking Θ to be a singleton.
We begin by applying the pullback functor ρ(Θ)∗ : S → S/ρ(Θ) to ρ, obtaining
a new variable assignment ρΘ : Γ→ S/ρ(Θ). Now for any variable x : 1→ X in Θ,
the corresponding projection ρ(Θ)→ ρ(X) induces a map
pix : 1ρ(Θ) → ρ(Θ)∗ρ(X) = ρΘ(X)
in S/ρ(Θ). We define ρ′Θ : (Γ,Θ) → S/ρ(Θ) to extend ρΘ by ρ′Θ(x) = pix for each
such x.
The variable assignment ρ′Θ allows us to interpret each object- and arrow-term in
context (Γ,Θ) in S/ρ(Θ). In particular, each ∆0-term is interpreted by a morphism
with domain ρ(Θ). If f and g are two such ∆0-terms, we let Jf = gK ρ(Θ) denote
the equalizer of ρ′Θ(f) and ρ
′
Θ(g). It is clear that t : 1 → ρ(Θ) factors throughJf = gK if and only if (f = g)(t) holds.
Now we can build up JϕK for all other formulas ϕ in the usual inductive way using
the Heyting category structure of S, with intersections and unions interpreting ∧
and ∨, the Heyting implication for ⇒, images for ∃, and dual images for ∀. It is
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easy to verify, using all parts of the definition of constructive well-pointedness, that
at each step the desired property is maintained.
Conversely, assume ∆0-separation (ii) and that 1 is a strong generator. The
argument of Lemma 4.7(ii) still applies to show that a morphism is monic iff it is
injective on global elements. Let M denote the class of monos and E the class of
morphisms that are surjective on global elements. Because 1 is a strong generator,
any morphism in E is extremal epic (i.e. factors through no proper subobject of its
codomain). Moreover, E is evidently stable under pullback.
For any map f : Y → X, apply ∆0-separation to the formula (∃y ∈ Y )(f(y) = x)
to obtain a monic m : S  X. The pullback of m along f is a monic which is
bijective on global elements, hence an isomorphism; thus f factors through m, and
the factorization e : Y → S is in E by construction. Therefore, (E ,M) is a pullback-
stable factorization system, from which it follows that S is a regular category and
that E is exactly the class of regular epics—and hence 1 is projective.
Now given monos m : A  X and n : B  X, apply ∆0-separation to the
formula (∃a ∈ A)(m(a) = x) ∨ (∃b ∈ B)(n(b) = x) to obtain a monic S  X.
Lemma 4.7(iii) still applies to show that A ⊆ S and B ⊆ S and that if A ⊆ T and
B ⊆ T then S ⊆ T ; thus S = A∪B. The defining property of S (it contains precisely
those 1 → X factoring through either A or B) is evidently stable under pullback.
Similarly, from the formula ϕ(x) = ⊥ we obtain a pullback-stable bottom element
0  X, so S is a coherent category. Moreover, by the construction of unions and
empty subobjects, it follows that 1 is indecomposable and nonempty. Finally, dual
images can similarly be constructed by applying ∆0-separation to a formula with
a universal ∆0-quantifier. 
Further categorical properties can also be reformulated in set-theoretic terms.
Proposition 5.2. A constructively well-pointed Heyting category is Boolean if and
only if it satisfies ∆0-classical logic: ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for all ∆0-formulas ϕ.
Proof. For a subobject S  A, let ¬S  A be the Heyting negation. By well-
pointedness, x : 1→ A factors through ¬S if and only if it does not factor through
S. Since px factors through Sq is ∆0, giving ∆0-classical logic every such x factors
through S or ¬S; so by well-pointedness, S ∪ ¬S = A and S is complemented.
Conversely, if the category is Boolean, then any ∆0-formula ϕ has a classifying
subobject JϕK, and negation of formulas corresponds to the Heyting negation. Thus,
if JϕK is complemented, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ must be valid. 
Proposition 5.3. A constructively well-pointed Heyting category is a topos if and
only if it satisfies the following axiom:
• pfor any X there is an object PX and a relation [∈X ]  X × PX such that for
any S  X, there exists a unique s : 1→ PX such that for all x : 1→ X, we have
that x factors through S if and only if 〈x, s〉 factors through [∈X ]q.
Proof. The necessity of this axiom follows from the universal property of power
objects. Conversely, assuming it, let R  X × Y be any subobject. Using ∆0-
separation, let F  Y × PX contain exactly those pairs 〈y, s〉 such that for all
x : 1→ X, we have that 〈x, y〉 factors through R if and only if 〈x, s〉 factors through
[∈X ]. By the given axiom, for any y : 1→ Y there is a unique s : 1→ PX such that
x factors through y∗R if and only if 〈x, s〉 factors through [∈X ], and this if and only
if 〈y, s〉 factors through F . Therefore, since 1 is a strong generator, the projection
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F → Y is invertible, and so F defines a map f : Y → PX. By Lemma 4.7(iii), we
have f∗([∈X ]) ∼= R, and uniqueness is likewise easy. 
Proposition 5.4. A constructively well-pointed Heyting category is cartesian closed
if and only if it satisfies the following axiom:
• pFor any X and Y , there is an object Y X and an arrow ev : Y X × X → Y such
that for any f : X → Y , there is a unique z : 1 → Y X such that for all x : 1 → X
we have ev ◦ 〈z, x〉 = f ◦ xq.
Proof. Analogous. 
We will see in Proposition 7.8 that in the presence of a structural replacement
axiom, the axiom in Proposition 5.4 also implies local cartesian closure, just as with
limited ∆0-replacement and exponentiation in material set theory.
Remark 5.5. The expressive power of ∆0-formulas depends on the other categorical
structure that is present. For instance, in a cartesian closed category, morphisms
f : X → Y are equivalent to morphisms 1 → Y X , so ∆0-separation implies sepa-
ration for formulas including quantifiers over arbitrary arrow-variables. Similarly,
in a topos we can effectively quantify over subobjects of any A (that is, objects S
equipped with a monomorphism S  A) by quantifying over morphisms 1→ PA;
the mono S  A is determined only up to isomorphism by its classifying map
1→ PA, but by isomorphism-invariance (Lemma 3.4) this is invisible to our logic.
Convention 5.6. From now on we will use the following more “set-theoretic” ter-
minology and notation for structural set theories. We write Set for the category in
question, and call its objects sets and its arrows functions. We speak of morphisms
1→ X as elements of X, and we write x :∈ X to mean x : 1→ X. If f : X → Y is
a function and x :∈ X, we write f(x) :∈ Y for f ◦ x : 1 → Y . Similarly, we speak
of monomorphisms S  X as subsets of X and write S :⊆ X.
The notations :∈ and :⊆ are a hybrid of the familiar set-theoretic ∈ and ⊆
with the type-theoretic x : A. Unlike the former, but like the latter, they are not
propositions of the theory that can be true or false, but rather typing judgments
which indicate what sort of thing their left-hand argument is. By contrast, given
x :∈ X and S :⊆ X, we write x ∈ S for the statement p1 x−→ X factors through
S  Xq, which is a proposition of the theory. Similarly, for S, T :⊆ X, we write
S ⊆ T for the statement pS  X factors through T  Xq.
6. Structural separation, fullness, and induction
There are several axioms from material set theory for which we have not yet
considered structural versions. In this section, we consider full separation, fullness,
and induction; in the next we consider collection and replacement.
The structural axiom of full separation simply generalizes Proposition 5.1(ii) to
unbounded quantifiers.
• Separation: For any formula ϕ(x), pfor any set X, there exists S :⊆ X such that
for any x :∈ X, we have x ∈ S if and only if ϕ(x)q.
Lemma 6.1. If V satisfies the core axioms together with full separation, then
Set(V) satisfies separation.
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Proof. As observed in Remark 3.8, any formula ϕ in Set(V) in the language of
categories may be translated into a formula ϕ̂ in V in the language of material set
theory. If V satisfies material separation, then S = { x ∈ X | ϕ̂(x) } has the desired
property for structural separation. 
The structural axiom of fullness is also a direct translation of the material one.
• Fullness: pfor any sets X,Y there exists a relation R :⊆ M × X × Y such that
RM ×X is regular epic, and for any relation S :⊆ X × Y such that S  X is
regular epic, there exists an s :∈M such that (s, 1)∗R ⊆ Sq.
Lemma 6.2. If V satisfies the core axioms together with fullness, then Set(V)
satisfies structural fullness.
Proof. Just like the proofs for exponentials and power sets in Theorem 3.7. 
Remark 6.3. We have stated the axiom of fullness in a form referring explicitly to
global elements, analogous to the axioms appearing in Propositions 5.3 and 5.4.
Thus, unlike the properties of being a topos or being locally cartesian closed, this
axiom is only suitable in a well-pointed category. However, by interpreting the
above axiom in the stack semantics of [Shu18], we can obtain a fullness axiom that
makes sense more generally. (In fact, it is exactly the categorical version of fullness
from [vdBDM07, vdBM07], but lacking their ‘smallness’ conditions).
The axiom of induction, of course, only makes sense in the presence of the axiom
of infinity. The structural axiom of infinity (existence of an nno) asserts that
functions can be constructed by recursion, which implies Peano’s induction axiom
in the sense that any subset S :⊆ N which contains 0 :∈ N and is closed under
s : N → N must be all of N . (The proof of Theorem 3.7(v) essentially shows
that the converse holds in any Π-pretopos.) It follows from ∆0-separation that
∆0-formulas can be proven by induction; the axiom of full induction extends this
to arbitrary formulas.
• Induction: For any formula ϕ(x) with free variable x :∈ N , where N is an nno,
pif ϕ(0) and (∀n :∈ N)(ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(sx)), then ϕ(x) for all x :∈ Nq.
Just as in material set theory, infinity and full separation together imply full in-
duction. We also have:
Proposition 6.4. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, and also
the axioms of infinity, exponentials, and induction, then Set(V) has an nno and
satisfies induction.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 6.1, any formula ϕ(x) in Set(V) with x :∈ N
(where N = ω) can be rewritten as a formula in V, to which the material axiom of
induction can be applied. 
There is no particularly natural structural “axiom of foundation,” although in
§9 we will mention a somewhat related property. We can, however, formulate
structural axioms which are closely related to the material axiom of set-induction.
• Well-founded induction: For any formula ϕ(x) with free variable x :∈ A, pif A is
well-founded under the relation ≺, and moreover if ϕ(y) for all y ≺ x implies ϕ(x),
then in fact ϕ(x) for all x :∈ Aq.
• Extensional well-founded induction: The same, but requiring A to also be ex-
tensional.
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These axioms are implied by separation, since then we can form { x :∈ A | ϕ(x) }
and apply the definition of well-foundedness. We can also say:
Proposition 6.5. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory, and also the
axioms of set-induction and Mostowski’s principle, then Set(V) satisfies extensional
well-founded induction. If V additionally has power sets, then Set(V) satisfies well-
founded induction.
Proof. By Mostowski’s principle, any extensional well-founded relation is isomor-
phic to a transitive set. Thus, set-induction performed over the resulting transitive
set can be used for inductive proofs over the original well-founded relation. Fi-
nally, with power sets, any well-founded relation can be collapsed to a well-founded
extensional one (an “extensional quotient” in the sense of §8). 
7. Structural collection and replacement
We now turn to structural versions of the collection and replacement axioms.
Various such axioms have been proposed in the context of ETCS (see [Law64, Col73,
Osi74, McL04]), but none of these seem to be quite appropriate in an intuitionistic or
predicative theory. Hence our axioms must be different from all previous proposals
(though they are similar to the replacement axiom of [McL04]).
The intuition behind structural collection is that since the elements of a set in
a structural theory are not themselves sets, instead of “collecting” sets as elements
of another set we must collect them as a family indexed over another set. Also,
since the language of category theory is two-sorted, it is unsurprising that we have
to assert collection for objects and morphisms separately. In fact, we find it con-
ceptually helpful to formulate three axioms of collection, although the third one is
automatically satisfied.
Remember that all formulas exist in an unstated ambient context Γ. (In partic-
ular, the object-variable U in the first two axioms below must belong to Γ.)
• Collection of sets: For any formula ϕ(u,X) with specified free variables u :∈ U
and X, pif for every u there exists an X with ϕ(u,X), then there exists a regular
epi V
p−− U and an A in Set/V such that for every v :∈ V we have ϕ(pv, v∗A)q.
• Collection of functions: For any formula ϕ(u,X, Y, f), with specified free vari-
ables u :∈ U , X, Y , and f : X → Y , pfor any A,B in Set/U , if for all u :∈ U
there exists u∗A
f−→ u∗B with ϕ(u, u∗A, u∗B, f), then there exists a regular epi
V
p−− U and a function p∗A g−→ p∗B in Set/V such that for all v :∈ V , we have
ϕ(pv, (pv)∗A, (pv)∗B, v∗g)q.
• Collection of equalities: pFor any set U , any A,B in Set/U , and any functions
f, g : A → B in Set/U , if u∗f = u∗g for every u :∈ U , then there is a regular epi
V
p−− U such that p∗f = p∗g.q
We will abbreviate a formula ϕ(u,X, Y, f) as in the axiom of collection of functions
by ϕ(u, f), with the object-variables X and Y implicitly present as the domain and
codomain of f .
We will say that Set “satisfies collection” if it satisfies all three of the above
axioms. However, one, and sometimes two, of these are redundant.
Proposition 7.1. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category.
(i) Set satisfies collection of equalities.
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(ii) If Set satisfies full separation and is a Π-pretopos, then it satisfies collection
of functions.
Proof. To show (i), let E
e−→ A be the equalizer of f and g and let S be the dual
image ∀aE, where A a−→ U is the structure map of A as an object of Set/U . The
assumption that u∗f = u∗g for every u :∈ U implies that every such u is contained
in S. Since 1 is a strong generator, this implies S ∼= U , and therefore E ∼= A and
so f = g; thus we can take V = U and p = 1U .
To show (ii), let C = (B → U)(A→U) be the exponential in Set/U , with projec-
tion C
g−→ U . Then each c :∈ C corresponds to a map fc : (gc)∗A→ (gc)∗B. Using
the axiom of separation, find a subobject V
m−→ C such that c :∈ C is contained
in V iff ϕ(fc). By assumption, every u :∈ U lifts to some c :∈ V , so since Set
is well-pointed, the projection V
gm−− U is regular epi. Finally, there is an evident
map h : (gm)∗A→ (gm)∗B such that ϕ(gmc, c∗h) for all c :∈ V . 
The appropriate structural formulation of the axiom of replacement is a bit
more subtle. The idea is that if we modify the hypotheses of collection by asserting
unique existence, then passage to a cover V  U should be unnecessary. As with
collection, we may expect three versions for sets, functions and equalities. The
second two of these are easy to state, and follow from collection.
Proposition 7.2. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category.
(i) Set always satisfies replacement of equalities: pfor any set U , any A,B in
Set/U , and any functions f, g : A → B in Set/U , if u∗f = u∗g for every
u :∈ U , then f = gq.
(ii) If Set satisfies collection of functions, then it satisfies replacement of func-
tions: For any formula ϕ(u, f) as in collection of functions, pfor any A,B
in Set/U , if for every u :∈ U there exists a unique u∗A f−→ u∗B such that
ϕ(u, f), then there exists A
g−→ B in Set/U such that for each u :∈ U we have
ϕ(u, u∗f)q.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 7.1(i) already shows (i). For (ii), collection of
functions gives us a regular epimorphism V
p−− U and a function h : p∗A → p∗B
in Set/V such that ϕ(pv, v∗h) for any v :∈ V . If (r, s) : V ×U V ⇒ V is the kernel
pair of p, then for every z = (v1, v2) :∈ V ×U V we have pv1 = pv2 = u, say, and
thus ϕ(u, v∗1h) and ϕ(u, v
∗
2h). By uniqueness, v
∗
1h = v
∗
2h, and so
z∗r∗h = v∗1h = v
∗
2h = z
∗s∗h.
By replacement of equalities, r∗h = s∗h. But the self-indexing of Set is a prestack,
so h descends to g : A → B with p∗g = h. Since p is regular epic, for any u :∈ U
there is a v :∈ V with pv = u; thus u∗h = v∗p∗h = v∗g, whence ϕ(u, u∗h). 
These two replacement axioms imply, in particular, that universal properties are
reflected by global elements. Rather than give a precise statement of this, we present
a paradigmatic example.
Proposition 7.3. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting category sat-
isfying replacement of functions, and suppose we have A,B,E in Set/X and a
morphism v : E ×X A → B such that for all x :∈ X, x∗v exhibits x∗E as an
exponential (x∗B)(x
∗A) in Set. Then v exhibits E as an exponential BA in Set/X.
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Proof. The assumption means that for any object C and any morphism f : C ×
x∗A → x∗B, there exists a unique g : C → x∗E such that f = x∗v ◦ (g × 1). In
particular, given any D in Set/X and morphism f : D×XA→ B, for every x :∈ X
there is a unique gx : x
∗D → x∗E such that x∗f = x∗v ◦ (gx × 1). By replacement
of functions, we have g : D → E such that x∗f = x∗v ◦ (x∗g × 1) for each x :∈ X,
or equivalently x∗f = x∗(v ◦ (g× 1)). By replacement of equalities, f = v ◦ (g× 1).
Moreover, if f = v ◦ (h × 1) for some h : D → E, then for each x :∈ X we have
x∗f = x∗v ◦ (x∗h× 1). By the universal property of the exponential x∗E, we have
x∗h = gx = x∗g, and hence h = g by replacement of equalities. 
Note that all such universal properties are automatically pullback-stable.
We would also like an axiom of “replacement of sets,” which would ensure that
the existence of an object satisfying a universal property is also reflected by global
elements. Since no structural theory can determine an object of a category more
uniquely than up to unique isomorphism, one natural such statement would be:
• Replacement of sets: pif for every u :∈ U there is a set A with ϕ(u,A) which is
unique up to unique isomorphism, then there is a B in Set/U such that ϕ(u, u∗B)
for all u :∈ Uq.
If Set is a pretopos (and in particular exact), then replacement of sets follows from
collection by a proof analogous to that of Proposition 7.2, using the fact that in
this case the self-indexing is a stack for the regular topology. Moreover, just as in
material set theory, we have:
Proposition 7.4. If S is a well-pointed Heyting category which satisfies full clas-
sical logic and replacement of sets, then it also satisfies full separation.
Proof. For any formula ϕ(x) with free variable x :∈ X, let ψ(x,A) be pA is terminal
and ϕ(x), or A is initial and ¬ϕ(x)q. Since (∀x)(ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)) holds by classical
logic, and initial and terminal objects are unique up to unique isomorphism, by
replacement of sets we have a B in Set/X such that for any x :∈ X, if ϕ(x) then
x∗B is terminal, while if ¬ϕ(x) then x∗B is initial. It follows that B → X is monic,
and is the subobject classifying ϕ required by the separation axiom. 
However, for most other purposes replacement of sets is basically useless, since
hardly ever is a set determined up to absolutely unique isomorphism, only an iso-
morphism which is compatible with some additional functions whose existence is
being asserted at the same time. For example, a cartesian product A×B is only de-
termined up to an isomorphism which is unique such that it respects the projections
A×B → A and A×B → B with which the product comes equipped.
In order to state a useful version of replacement, we recall the notion of context
extension from Notation 3.2: if (Γ,Θ) is a context, then we can write ϕ(Θ) in
context Γ if ϕ is a formula whose free variables all lie in (Γ,Θ). Since all contexts are
finite, we can write formulas like pthere exists Θ. . . q or pfor all Θ. . . q in context Γ,
abbreviating a finite list of ordinary quantifiers. Similarly, if (Γ,Ξ,Θ) is a context,
then for a given Ξ in context Γ we can write pthere exists Θ extending Ξ. . . q. For
instance, if Ξ = (X,Y ) and Θ = (f : X → Y ), then pthere exists Θ extending
(A,B). . . q means pthere exists f : A→ B. . . q.
We will write Θ′ for a context obtained from Θ by replacing all of its variables
by fresh ones (hereafter denoted with primes, X 7→ X ′), so that (Γ,Θ,Θ′) is also
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a context. We write ΦΘ for a list of arrow-variables φX : X → X ′, one for each
object-variable X in Θ; thus (Γ,Θ,Θ′,ΦΘ) is also a context. Finally, we will write
pΦΘ is an isomorphism Θ ∼= Θ′q
for the formula ϕ(Θ,Θ′,ΦΘ) in context Γ which asserts that
(i) for every object-variable X in Θ, φX is an isomorphism; and
(ii) for every arrow-variable f : X → Y in Θ, we have φY ◦ f = f ′ ◦ φX .
If X is in Γ rather than Θ, then φX denotes the identity 1X , and likewise for Y .
We can also talk about contexts and extensions of contexts in slice categories. A
particularly important example is that the context (X,x :∈ X) can be instantiated
in Set/U by the pair (U∗U,∆U ) consisting of the object U∗U = U × U and the
morphism ∆U : 1U → U∗U . Moreover, this pair is the universal such instantiation
over U , in that for any u : 1 → U we have an isomorphism u∗(U∗U,∆U ) ∼= (U, u).
Similarly, for any V
p−→ U we can consider (V ∗U, (1V , p)), which has the analogous
property that v∗(V ∗U, (1V , p)) ∼= (U, pv) for any v : 1→ V .
Proposition 7.5. A constructively well-pointed Heyting category satisfying collec-
tion also satisfies collection of contexts: for any formula ϕ(U, u :∈ U,Θ) (in any
context Γ, as always),
• pfor every U , if for every u :∈ U there exists Θ extending (U, u) such that ϕ(U, u,Θ),
then there exists a regular epi V
p−− U and a Θ′ in Set/V extending (V ∗U, (1V , p))
such that for every v :∈ V we have ϕ(U, pv, v∗Θ′)q.
Proof. Simply apply collection of sets and functions repeatedly, using the fact that
regular epimorphisms compose. 
We can now improve “replacement of sets” to a more useful axiom.
• Replacement of contexts: for any formula ϕ(U, u :∈ U,Θ), pfor any U , if for every
u :∈ U there is an extension Θ of (U, u) such that ϕ(U, u,Θ), and moreover this
extension Θ is unique up to a unique isomorphism of contexts ΦΘ, then there is an
extension Θ′ of (U∗U,∆U ) in Set/U such that ϕ(U, u, u∗Θ′) for all u :∈ Uq.
Proposition 7.6. Any constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos satisfying col-
lection also satisfies replacement of contexts.
Proof. By Proposition 7.5, there is a regular epi p : V  U and a Θ′ in Set/V such
that for every v :∈ V we have ϕ(U, pv, v∗Θ′). Let (r, s) : V ×U V ⇒ V be the kernel
pair of f , and consider r∗Θ′ and s∗Θ′ in Set/V ×U V . The assumption implies
that when pulled back along any z : 1 → V ×U V , these two contexts become
uniquely isomorphic. Thus, by replacement of functions and equalities applied
some finite number of times, we actually have a unique isomorphism r∗Θ′ ∼= s∗Θ′
in Set/V ×U V . Uniqueness implies that this isomorphism satisfies the cocycle
condition over V ×U V ×U V . Thus, since Set is a stack for its regular topology
(applied some finite number of times), the entire context Θ′ descends to some Θ′′
in Set/U . Since p is surjective, the desired property for Θ′′ follows. 
I do not know whether replacement of contexts implies collection. But as in
material set theory, replacement suffices in the classical world.
Proposition 7.7. Over ETCS, the following are equivalent.
(i) Replacement of contexts.
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(ii) Collection of sets.
(iii) Full separation and collection (of both sets and functions).
Proof. By Propositions 7.1(ii), 7.4, and 7.6, it suffices to prove that replacement
of contexts implies collection of sets. Given a formula ϕ(u,X), we can construct
a context Θ including both a set X and a binary relation on it, and let ψ(u,Θ)
assert that ϕ(u,X) holds and that the given relation is a well-ordering, which
has the smallest possible order-type among well-ordered sets X such that ϕ(u,X).
Since classically, any set admits a smallest well-ordering which is unique up to
unique isomorphism, we can apply replacement of contexts to ψ and thereby deduce
collection of sets. 
As promised, replacement of contexts implies that the existence of objects satis-
fying a universal property is reflected by global elements. Continuing the example
of Proposition 7.3, we have the following.
Proposition 7.8. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Heyting pretopos satis-
fying replacement of contexts. If Set is cartesian closed, then it is locally cartesian
closed.
Proof. Let A,B be in Set/X; we want to construct the exponential (B → X)(A→X).
For x :∈ X, let ϕ(x,E, e) assert that e : E × x∗A → x∗B exhibits E as the expo-
nential (x∗B)x
∗A. This formula can be phrased as ψ(X,x,Θ) for some Θ, although
we note that Θ involves not just E and e but also object-variables for x∗A, x∗B,
and E × x∗A, and arrow-variables giving the projections that exhibit these as two
pullbacks and a cartesian product, respectively.
Now, since Set is cartesian closed, for every x :∈ X there exists E and e with
ϕ(x,E, e), and such are unique up to a unique isomorphism which respects all
the structure. Therefore, replacement of contexts supplies an instantiation of Θ
extending (X∗X,∆X) in Set/X. This consists essentially of an object C and a
morphism c : C ×X A→ B. The conclusion of replacement of contexts implies that
C and c satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 7.3, so they must be an exponential
(B → X)(A→X) as desired. 
We end this section by extending Theorem 3.7 to the axiom of collection.
Theorem 7.9. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory along with
collection, then Set(V) satisfies structural collection.
Proof. If V satisfies material collection, then given the setup of collection of sets
for some formula ϕ, let ψ(u,X) assert that X is a Kuratowski ordered pair of the
form (u,X ′) with ϕ(u,X ′). By material collection, let V be a set such that for any
u ∈ U , there is an X ∈ V with ψ(u,X), and for any X ∈ V , there is a u ∈ U with
ψ(u,X). Then every element of V is an ordered pair whose first element is in U ,
so there is a projection V → U , which by assumption is surjective. We can then
form B =
⋃
(u,X′)∈V X
′, and by ∆0-separation cut out
A = { ((u,X ′), a) ∈ V ×B | a ∈ X ′ } .
Then A is an object of Set(V)/V , and for any v = (u,X ′) ∈ V , v∗A is isomorphic
to X ′. Thus, by isomorphism-invariance, we have ϕ(u, v∗A), as required. Collection
of functions is analogous. 
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As far as I can tell, however, the material axiom of replacement does not seem to
imply the structural axiom of replacement of contexts (in the absence of classical
logic). This, I feel, is one of the reasons (though not the only one) that the material
axiom of collection is necessary in practice. For example, it is well-known that while
some types of “infinite iteration” can be performed in a topos with a nno, and
consequently some sorts of “free structures” can be proven to exist (c.f. [JW78]), this
is not always the case. However, infinite iteration (and more generally, transfinite
iteration over a well-founded relation) is always possible in a well-pointed topos
satisfying our structural axioms of induction and replacement. In [Shu18] we will
see how to extend this observation to the non-well-pointed case.
8. Constructing material set theories
So far we have summarized the axioms of material set theory and structural
set theory, and explained how most axioms of material set theory are reflected in
structural properties of the resulting category of sets. We now turn to the opposite
construction: how to recover a material set theory from a structural one. A “set”
in material set theory, of course, contains much more information than a “set” in
structural set theory, namely the membership relations between its elements, their
elements, and so on. This gives rise to the idea of modeling a “material set” by a
graph or tree with nodes depicting sets and edges depicting membership.
This basic idea was used by [Col73, Mit72, Osi74] in the first equiconsistency
proofs of ETCS with BZC, and nearly identical constructions have been used for
relative consistency proofs by others such as [Acz88] and [Mat01]. Here we perform
essentially the same construction, but with an attention to details that ensures
everything works in an intuitionistic or predicative context.
For the rest of this section, we work in a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos
with an nno, denoted Set. I do not know whether an analogous construction can
be made to work under weaker assumptions than this.
Definitions 8.1.
(i) A graph is a set X, whose elements are called nodes, equipped with a binary
relation ≺.
(ii) If x ≺ y we say that x is a child of y.
(iii) A pointed graph is one equipped with a distinguished node ? called the root.
(iv) A pointed graph is accessible if for every node x there exists a path x =
xn ≺ · · · ≺ x0 = ? to the root.
(v) For any node x of a graph X, we write X/x for the full subgraph of X
consisting of those y admitting some path to x. It is, of course, pointed by x,
and accessible.
“Accessible pointed graph” is abbreviated apg.
Remark 8.2. The hypothesis on Set is necessary to formalize “accessibility” and
to define X/x. Specifically, a pointed graph X≺  X × X with root ? :∈ X is
accessible if for every x :∈ X, there exists a nonzero finite cardinal [n] and a map
[n]→ X≺ realizing a path from x to ?. (Recall that a finite cardinal is the pullback
along a map 1 → N of the second projection N< → N of the strict order relation
on the nno.) The definition of X/x is similar, using the fact that ∆0-separation
can be applied to functions in a Π-pretopos.
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We are using the terminology of [Acz88]. The idea is that an arbitrary graph
represents a collection of material-sets with ≺ representing the membership relation
between them, a pointed graph represents a particular set (the root) together with
all the data required to describe its hereditary membership relation, and an apg
does this without any superfluous data (all the nodes bear some relation to the
root). Thus, an arbitrary apg can be considered a picture of a possibly non-well-
founded set: the root represents the set itself, its children represent the elements of
the set, and so on.
We will henceforth restrict attention to graphs for which ≺ is well-founded,
thereby ensuring that the models of material set theory we construct satisfy the
axiom of foundation. It is also possible, by changing this requirement, to construct
models satisfying the various axioms of anti-foundation (see [Acz88]), but we will
not do that here. Recall the definition:
Definition 8.3. A subset S of a graph X is inductive if for any node x :∈ X, if
all children of x are in S, then x is also in S. A graph X is well-founded if any
inductive subset of X is equal to all of X.
In the presence of classical logic, well-foundedness is equivalent to saying that
every inhabited subset of X has a ≺-minimal element, but in intuitionistic logic
that version is too strong:
Proposition 8.4. If there exists a graph X containing nodes u, v with u ≺ v, and
such that every inhabited subset S :⊆ X has a ≺-minimal element (i.e. there exists
an x ∈ S such that y ⊀ x for all y ∈ S), then excluded middle holds (i.e. Set is
Boolean).
Proof. I learned this proof from Zhen Lin Low and Daniil Frumin. By Lemma 4.8,
to prove Set is Boolean it suffices to prove it is two-valued. Thus, let P be a
subterminal object, i.e. a proposition, and let S = { y :∈ X | y = v ∨ (y = u ∧ P ) }.
Then S is inhabited (by v), so it has a ≺-minimal element y. On the one hand, if
y = v, then ¬P , for if P then u ∈ S and so y would not be ≺-minimal in S. But
on the other hand, if (y = u ∧ P ), then P . 
Amusingly (and perhaps surprisingly), it follows that “classical well-foundedness”
implies “inductive” well-foundedness even in the absence of classical logic:
Corollary 8.5. If X is a graph in which every inhabited subset S :⊆ X has a
≺-minimal element, then it is well-founded.
Proof. Let S be inductive and x :∈ X; we want to show x ∈ S. Since S is
inductive, it suffices to show that for any y ≺ x we have y ∈ S. But if y ≺ x, then
by Proposition 8.4 excluded middle holds; thus X is well-founded, so S = X and
hence x ∈ S. 
We will say no more about classical well-foundedness. The intuitionistically
correct Definition 8.3 of well-foundedness suffices to perform proofs by induction
on a well-founded graph: by proving that a given subset is inductive, we conclude
it is the whole graph. In order to prove a statement by well-founded induction,
we must apply separation to the statement to turn it into a subset; thus either
the statement must be ∆0 or we must have a stronger separation axiom. We can
also use well-founded induction in more than one variable, since if X and Y are
well-founded then so is X × Y .
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We record some observations about well-founded graphs.
Lemma 8.6. Any subset of a well-founded graph is well-founded with the induced
relation.
Proof. For any Z :⊆ X, if S :⊆ Z is inductive in Z, then the Heyting implication
(Z ⇒ S) ⊆ X is inductive in X. 
Lemma 8.7. If X is a well-founded graph, then there does not exist any cyclic
path x = xn ≺ · · · ≺ x0 = x in X.
Proof. If there were, then the Heyting complement of {x0, . . . , xn} ⊆ X would be
inductive but not all of X. 
Lemma 8.8. If X is a well-founded graph and x :∈ X, then x : 1 → X/x is a
complemented subobject. In particular, it is decidable whether or not a node of a
well-founded apg is the root.
Proof. By definition, every node y :∈ X/x admits some path to x, of length n :∈ N
say. Since 0 is a complemented subobject of N , either n = 0, in which case y = x,
or n > 0. If n > 0, then if x = y there would be a cyclic path from x to itself; hence
in this case x 6= y. Thus for all y, either y = x or y 6= x, as desired. 
Definition 8.9. We will write Xx for the complement of x in X/x, i.e. the set of
nodes admitting a path to x of length > 0. In particular, X? is the complement
of the root.
We also need our apgs to satisfy the axiom of extensionality.
Definition 8.10. An graph X is extensional if for any two nodes x and y, if
z ≺ x⇔ z ≺ y for all z, then x = y.
For non-well-founded graphs, this definition would have to be strengthened in
one of various possible ways (see [Acz88]).
Remark 8.11. An equivalent characterization of the universe of extensional well-
founded apgs can be obtained by working with well-founded rigid trees instead. A
tree is an apg in which every node x admits a unique path to the root, and it is
rigid if for any node z and any children x ≺ z and y ≺ z, if X/x ∼= X/y, then x = y.
Every extensional well-founded apg X has an “unfolding” into a well-founded rigid
tree Xt, whose nodes are the paths in X, and conversely every well-founded rigid
tree is the unfolding of some extensional well-founded apg. Rigid trees are used
by [Col73, Mit72] and [MLM94], while extensional relations are used by [Osi74]
and [Joh77], but they result in essentially equivalent theories. (In the non-well-
founded case, however, extensional relations seem more generally applicable than
rigid trees; see [Acz88].)
We now record some observations about extensionality and well-foundedness.
Definition 8.12. An initial segment of a graph X is a subset Y :⊆ X such that
x ≺ y ∈ Y implies x ∈ Y .
Lemma 8.13. Any initial segment of an extensional graph is extensional with the
induced relation. 
Lemma 8.14. If X is a well-founded extensional graph and X/x ∼= X/y, then
x = y.
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Proof. We prove this by well-founded induction. If g : X/x ∼−→ X/y, then for all
x′ ≺ x we have X/x′ ∼= X/g(x′), where g(x′) ≺ y; hence by induction x′ = g(x′).
Similarly, we have y′ = g−1(y′) for all y′ ≺ y. By extensionality, x = y. 
In the language of [Acz88], Lemma 8.14 says that well-founded extensional graphs
are “Finsler-extensional.”
Lemma 8.15. Any automorphism of a well-founded extensional graph is the iden-
tity. Therefore, any two parallel isomorphisms of well-founded extensional graphs
are equal.
Proof. Let f : X ∼−→ X be an isomorphism; we prove by well-founded induction
that f(x) = x for all x ∈ X. But if f(x′) = x′ for all x′ ≺ x, then extensionality
immediately implies f(x) = x. 
Definition 8.16. We write V(Set) for the class of well-founded extensional apgs
in Set.
Our goal is now to show that V(Set) is a model of a material set theory. We
consider two apgs to be equal, i.e. to represent the same material-set, when they
are isomorphic. And we model the membership relation ∈ in the expected way:
Definition 8.17. If X is an apg, the children of its root are called its members.
We write |X| for the set of members of X. If X and Y are apgs, we write X  Y
to mean that X ∼= Y/y for some member y :∈ |Y |.
Here is our omnibus theorem.
Theorem 8.18. Let Set be a constructively well-pointed Π-pretopos with a nno,
and let ϕ be a formula of material set theory. Then V(Set)  ϕ whenever any of
the following holds.
• ϕ is the axiom of extensionality, empty set, pairing, union, exponentiation, in-
finity, foundation, transitive closures, Mostowski’s principle, or an instance of
∆0-separation.
• Set satisfies structural fullness and ϕ is material fullness.
• Set is a topos and ϕ is the power set axiom.
• Set satisfies structural separation and ϕ is an instance of material separation.
• Set satisfies structural collection and ϕ is an instance of material collection.
• Set satisfies replacement of contexts and ϕ is an instance of material replace-
ment.
• Set is Boolean and ϕ is an instance of ∆0-classical logic.
• Set satisfies full classical logic and ϕ is an instance of full classical logic.
• Set satisfies induction and ϕ is an instance of full induction.
• Set satisfies the axiom of choice and ϕ is the material axiom of choice.
• Set satisfies extensional well-founded induction and ϕ is an instance of set-
induction.
Remark 8.19. As in Remark 3.8, we can also interpret this theorem as giving a
translation of formulas in the language of material set theory into formulas in the
language of structural set theory, and thereby obtain an equiconsistency result
under weaker assumptions on the metatheory.
We will prove this theorem with a series of lemmas, but first we need to introduce
some auxiliary notions leading up to the construction of extensional quotients.
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Definition 8.20. Let X and Y be graphs. A simulation from X to Y is a function
f : X → Y such that
(i) if x′ ≺ x, then f(x′) ≺ f(x), and
(ii) if y ≺ f(x), then there exists an x′ ≺ x with f(x′) = y.
A bisimulation from X to Y is a relation R :⊆ X ×Y such that both projections
R → X and R → Y are simulations (where R is considered as a full subgraph of
X × Y ). A bisimulation is bi-entire if R→ X and R→ Y are surjective.
Note that if f : X → Y is a simulation, then the relation (1, f) : X → X × Y is
a bisimulation, which is bi-entire iff f is surjective.
An example of a simulation is the inclusion of an initial segment. The following
lemma says that for extensional well-founded graphs, these are the only simulations.
Lemma 8.21. If X is well-founded and extensional, then any simulation f : X →
Y is injective, and isomorphic to the inclusion of an initial segment.
Proof. We show by well-founded induction that f(x1) = f(x2) implies x1 = x2.
Suppose f(x1) = f(x2); then for any z1 ≺ x1, we have f(z1) ≺ f(x1) = f(x2),
so since f is a simulation there is a z2 ≺ x2 with f(z2) = f(z1). Hence z1 = z2
by induction, so z1 ≺ x2. Dually, z2 ≺ x2 implies z2 ≺ x1, so by extensionality
x1 = x2. Finally, any injective simulation must be an initial segment. 
Lemma 8.22. If R is a bi-entire bisimulation from X to Y , then X is well-founded
if and only if Y is so.
Proof. Suppose X is well-founded and S ⊆ Y is inductive. Let T :⊆ X consist of
those x :∈ X such that R(x, y) implies y ∈ S; we show T is inductive. Suppose
x :∈ X is such that x′ ≺ x implies x′ ∈ T , and that R(x, y). Then for any y′ ≺ y
there is an x′ ≺ x with R(x′, y′), whence x′ ∈ T and thus y′ ∈ S. So since S is
inductive, y must be in S. Thus x ∈ T , so T is inductive. Since X is well-founded,
T = X, and then since R is bi-entire, S = Y ; thus Y is well-founded. 
Lemma 8.23. Any bi-entire bisimulation between extensional well-founded graphs
must be an isomorphism.
Proof. Let R :⊆ X×Y be such. We show by well-founded induction that if R(x, y1)
and R(x, y2), then y1 = y2. For if z1 ≺ y1, then since R is a bisimulation, there is
a w ≺ x with R(w, z1), and again since R is a bisimulation, there is a z2 ≺ y2 with
R(w, z2). By induction, z1 = z2, so that z1 ≺ y2 for any z1 ≺ y1. By symmetry, for
any z2 ≺ y2 we have z2 ≺ y1, hence by extensionality y1 = y2.
By symmetry, if R(x1, y) and R(x2, y) then x1 = x2, so R is functional in both
directions. Since it is also bi-entire, it must be an an isomorphism. 
Lemma 8.24. If X is well-founded, then it is extensional if and only if every
bisimulation from X to X is contained in the identity.
Proof. Suppose first X is well-founded and extensional and R is a bisimulation
with R(x1, x2). Then R is a bi-entire bisimulation from X/x1 to X/x2 (by ordinary
induction on length of paths), so by Lemma 8.23 it must be an isomorphism X/x1 ∼=
X/x2. But X is well-founded and extensional, so by Lemma 8.14, x1 = x2.
Now suppose that every bisimulation from X to X is contained in the identity,
and also that x, y :∈ X are such that z ≺ x ⇔ z ≺ y for all z. Define R(a, b) to
COMPARING MATERIAL AND STRUCTURAL SET THEORIES 31
hold if either a = b, or a = x and b = y. Then R is a bisimulation, and if it is
contained in the identity, then x = y; hence X is extensional. 
In the language of [Acz88], Lemma 8.24 says that for well-founded graphs, ex-
tensionality is equivalent to “strong extensionality.”
Corollary 8.25. If Y is well-founded and extensional, then any two simulations
f, g : X ⇒ Y are equal.
Proof. The image of (f, g) : X → Y × Y is a bisimulation, hence contained in the
identity. 
Therefore, well-founded extensional graphs and simulations form a (large) pre-
order. In the language of material set theory, this preorder represents the partial
order of transitive-sets and subset inclusions.
Lemma 8.26. If X is a graph and R is a bisimulation from X to X which is an
equivalence relation, then its quotient Y inherits a graph structure such that the
quotient map [−] : X  Y is a simulation. Also, if X is an apg, then so is Y .
Proof. Define ≺ on Y to be minimal such that [−] preserves ≺, i.e. y1 ≺ y2 if there
exist x1 ≺ x2 in X with [x1] = y1 and [x2] = y2. Now suppose that y ≺ [x]. By
definition this means that there exist z1 ≺ z2 with [z1] = y and [z2] = [x], i.e.
R(z2, x) holds. But R is a bisimulation, so there exists x
′ ≺ x with R(z1, x′), i.e.
[x′] = y; hence [−] is a simulation. If X is an apg, we define the root of Y to be
[?]; accessibility of Y follows directly from that of X. 
Of course, by Lemma 8.22, if X is well-founded, then so is the quotient Y . This
gives us a way to construct extensional quotients in some cases.
Lemma 8.27. If Set is either a topos or satisfies full separation, then for every
well-founded relation X there is a surjective simulation X  X where X is well-
founded and extensional, and an apg if X is.
Proof. Note that the union of any family of bisimulations is a bisimulation. More
specifically, if we have a relation R :⊆ A × X × X such that for each a :∈ A
the relation a∗R :⊆ X ×X is a bisimulation, then its image piAR :⊆ X ×X is a
bisimulation. If Set is a topos, then we can take A to be the set of all bisimulations
(a subset of P (X ×X)), obtaining thereby the largest bisimulation.
A largest bisimulation R, if it exists, is necessarily an equivalence relation, since
the identity, R ◦ R, and R−1 are all bisimulations as well and hence contained in
it. Moreover, if X is its quotient as in Lemma 8.26, then any bisimulation S on
X induces by pullback a bisimulation on X, which is contained in R, hence S is
contained in the identity; thus by Lemma 8.24 Y is extensional. This completes the
topos case. If instead Set satisfies full separation, then we can instead construct
the largest bisimulation as the set of all (x, y) :∈ X × X such that there exists a
bisimulation R from X to X with (x, y) ∈ R, and proceed similarly. 
Without power sets or separation, it seems impossible to construct all extensional
quotients, but we can still construct them in a useful amount of generality.
Lemma 8.28. Let n be a fixed external natural number, let X be a well-founded
apg, and assume that X/x is extensional whenever x is a node that admits a path
of length n to the root. Then there is an extensional well-founded apg X and a
surjective simulation q : X → X.
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Proof. The proof is by external induction on n. (We will only need this lemma for
n ≤ 3, so the reader is encouraged not to worry too much about what this induction
requires of the metatheory.) The base case is easy: since the root ? admits a path
of length 0 to itself and X ∼= X/?, we can take X = X.
Now suppose the statement is true for some n, and let X satisfy the hypothesis
for n+1. For any k, write Xk for the set of nodes admitting a path of length k to the
root. Let the relation R on X be defined by R(x, y) if there exists an isomorphism
X/x ∼−→ X/y. (This can be constructed using ∆0-separation and local exponentials
in Set.) Then R is a bisimulation and an equivalence relation, so by Lemma 8.26 it
has a quotient Y which is again a well-founded apg, with [−] : X → Y a simulation.
We claim that Y satisfies the hypothesis for n. Let y ∈ Yn and suppose that
y1, y2 ∈ Y/y satisfy z ≺ y1 ⇔ z ≺ y2; we must show y1 = y2. Applying the
simulation property inductively, we have y = [x] for x ∈ Xn, and yi = [xi] with
xi ∈ X/x for i = 1, 2.
By Lemma 8.8, for each i either xi = x or xi ∈ X/wi for some wi ≺ x. If x1 = x
and x2 = x, then of course y1 = [x1] = [x2] = y2.
If x1 = x and x2 ∈ X/w2 with w2 ≺ x, then [w2] ≺ [x] = [x1] = y1. Thus, by
assumption, also [w2] ≺ y2 = [x2]. So by the simulation property, there is an x3
with [x3] = [w2] and x3 ≺ x2. Now x3 ≺ x2 and x2 ∈ X/w2 imply x3 ∈ X/w2,
while by definition of the quotient, [x3] = [w2] means that X/x3 ∼= X/w2, which
we can therefore rewrite as (X/w2)/x3 ∼= (X/w2)/w2. But since w2 ≺ x ∈ Xn, we
have w2 ∈ Xn+1, so by assumption X/w2 is extensional; thus Lemma 8.14 implies
that x3 = w2. Since x3 ≺ x2, this means w2 ≺ x2, contradicting x2 ∈ X/w2.5
Hence the only possible case is when xi ∈ X/wi with wi ≺ x for both i = 1, 2.
This implies that wi ∈ Xn+1, so each X/wi is extensional, and thus so is each
X/xi by Lemma 8.13. Therefore, by Lemma 8.21, the quotient map [−] : X → Y
induces an isomorphism X/xi ∼= Y/[xi] = Y/yi. But z ≺ y1 ⇔ z ≺ y2 means that
Y y1 ∼= Y y2, and hence (by Lemma 8.8) also Y/y1 ∼= Y/y2; thus we also have
X/x1 ∼= X/x2. Thus, by definition, R(x1, x2), and so y1 = [x1] = [x2] = y2.
We have shown that Y satisfies the hypothesis for n. Thus it has an extensional
quotient Y , and so the composite X → Y → Y is an extensional quotient of X. 
This also yields another hypothesis under which all extensional quotients exist.
Corollary 8.29. If Set satisfies well-founded induction and replacement of con-
texts, then for any well-founded apg X there is an extensional well-founded apg
X and a surjective simulation q : X → X.
Proof. For any well-founded apg X, we prove by induction on x :∈ X that the
apg X/x admits a surjective simulation X/x  Y where Y is well-founded and
extensional. (This requires the axiom of well-founded induction since the existence
of such a Y is an unbounded quantifier.) The case x = ? then yields the result.
Thus, suppose this is true for all y ≺ x, and let (X/−) be the transitive closure of
≺ restricted to X × |X/x|, regarded as an object of Set/|X/x|, so that y∗(X/−) ∼=
X/y for any y ≺ x. If Set satisfied collection, we could find a surjection f : A 
|X/x|, a pointed graph p : Y → A in Set/A (here “pointed” means we have a section
s : A → Y over A), and a function g : f∗(X/−) → Y in Set/A, such that for any
a :∈ A, the pullback a∗(g) is a surjective simulation X/f(a)  a∗Y where a∗Y is
5I am indebted to the referee for noticing a bug in my original handling of this case and
suggesting this correction.
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well-founded and extensional. But in fact replacement of contexts is sufficient for
this (and we can take A = |X/x|), because given X, the context extension consisting
of an extensional well-founded apg X and a surjective simulation q : X → X is
unique up to unique isomorphism if it exists by Lemma 8.23 and Corollary 8.25.6
Now give Y + 1 the relation ≺ induced from Y with also s(a) ≺ ? for all a :∈ A,
where ? is the new point added. Then Y +1 satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 8.28
with n = 1; let Z be its extensional quotient.
Define h : X/x → Z by sending x to the image of ? :∈ Y + 1, and sending
z ∈ Xx to its image by ga, where a :∈ A is such that z ≺ f(a). This is well-
defined since g then restricts to a surjective simulation X/z  Z/h(z), and there
can be only one h(z) :∈ Z with this property by extensionality of Z. 
We can now start verifying the axioms of material set theory.
Lemma 8.30. The axiom of extensionality holds. That is, two well-founded ex-
tensional apgs X and Y are isomorphic iff Z  X ⇔ Z  Y for all Z.
Proof. The “only if” direction is clear, so suppose that Z  X ⇔ Z  Y for all Z.
Then for every x :∈ |X|, we have X/x  Y , hence X/x ∼= Y/y for some y :∈ Y .
By Lemma 8.14, this y must be unique, and conversely as well; hence we have a
bijection g : |X| ∼−→ |Y | such that for any x :∈ |X| there exists an isomorphism
hx : X/x
∼−→ Y/g(x) (which must be unique, by Lemma 8.15). Define a relation R
from X to Y such that R(a, b) holds if:
(i) a = ? and b = ?, or
(ii) there exists x :∈ |X| such that a ∈ X/x, b ∈ Y/g(x), and hx(a) = b.
Then R is a bi-entire bisimulation, so by Lemma 8.23 it is an isomorphism. 
Lemma 8.31. The axioms of empty set, pairing, and union hold.
Proof. The empty set is represented by the apg with one node and no ≺ relations,
which has no members.
If X and Y are extensional well-founded apgs, let Z = X+Y +1 with ≺ induced
from X and Y along with ?X ≺ ? and ?Y ≺ ?, where ? is the new point added.
Since X and Y are extensional, Z satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 8.28 with
n = 1, and its extensional quotient represents the pair {X,Y }.
Finally, if X is an extensional well-founded apg, let ‖X‖ denote the subset of
those x :∈ X such that x ≺ y ≺ ? for some y, let Y be the subset of X consisting
of those nodes admitting some path to a node in ‖X‖, and define Z = Y + 1 with
≺ inherited from Y and with y ≺ ? for each y ∈ ‖X‖ ⊆ Y , where ? is the new
element added. Then Z satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 8.28 with n = 1, so it
has an extensional quotient, which is the desired union
⋃
X. 
Lemma 8.32. Cartesian products (using Kuratowski ordered pairs) exist in V(Set).
Proof. Let X and Y be extensional well-founded apgs, and consider the set
Z = (X?) + (Y ?) + |X|+ (|X| × |Y |) + (|X| × |Y |) + 1.
For x :∈ |X| we write x for its image in (X ?)  Z and x′ for its image in
|X|  Z. Similarly, we write y for images in Y ?, (x, y) for images in the first
copy of |X| × |Y |, (x, y)′ for images in the second copy, and ? for the final point.
We define ≺ on Z as follows:
6I am indebted to the referee for pointing this out.
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• ≺ on X? and Y ? is induced from X and Y .
• x ≺ x′ for all x :∈ |X|.
• x ≺ (x, y) and y ≺ (x, y) for all y :∈ |Y |.
• x′ ≺ (x, y)′ and (x, y) ≺ (x, y)′ for all x :∈ |X| and y :∈ |Y |.
• (x, y)′ ≺ ? for all x :∈ |X| and y :∈ |Y |.
It is straightforward to verify that Z is then a well-founded apg. Since X and Y are
extensional, Z satisfies the hypothesis of Lemma 8.28 with n = 3. Its extensional
quotient then represents the cartesian product of X and Y . 
Henceforth, we will write X⊗Y for the extensional well-founded apg constructed
above, which represents the cartesian product of the material sets X and Y . We will
also reuse the notations such as (x, y)′ for the images of these elements in X ⊗ Y .
Lemma 8.33. V(Set) satisfies the exponentiation axiom.
Proof. If X and Y are extensional well-founded apgs, define
W = ((X ⊗ Y )?) + |Y ||X| + 1
with ≺ induced from X⊗Y , along with (x, y)′ ≺ f whenever f(x) = y and f ≺ ? for
any f ∈ |Y ||X|. Then W is a well-founded apg, which is in fact already extensional;
we claim it represents the material function-set.
It is clear that if F  W , then F ∈ V(Set) is a function from X to Y in the
sense of material set theory. Conversely, from any F ∈ V(Set) which is a function
from X to Y , consider the subset of |X| × |Y | determined by those (x, y) such that
the Kuratowski ordered pair {{X/x}, {X/x, Y/y}} is  F . This defines a function
|X| → |Y | in Set, which therefore induces an f :∈ |W | such that F ∼= W/f . 
Observe that in particular, we have shown that for X,Y ∈ V(Set), there is a
1-1 correspondence between functions |X| → |Y | in Set and isomorphism classes of
apgs F ∈ V(Set) which represent functions from X to Y in the sense of material
set theory. In fact, although V(Set) need not satisfy limited ∆0-replacement, so
that Theorem 3.7 does not apply to it directly, we still have:
Lemma 8.34. The sets and functions in V(Set) form a category Set(V(Set)),
which can be identified with a full subcategory of Set closed under finite limits, sub-
sets, quotients, and local exponentials. In particular, Set(V(Set)) is a Π-pretopos.
Proof. We have observed closure under products and non-local exponentials. Clo-
sure under subsets is easy: if U :⊆ |X|, then the sub-graph Y of X consisting of
the root and all nodes admitting a path to U is a well-founded extensional apg
with |Y | ∼= U . This then implies closure under finite limits.
For quotients, if R is an equivalence relation on |X|, let q : |X| → Y be the
quotient of |X| by R in Set; then the apg
Z = (X?) + Y + 1,
with ≺ inherited from X along with x ≺ q(x) and y ≺ ? for all x :∈ |X| and y :∈ Y ,
is well-founded and extensional and has |Z| ∼= Y .
Finally, given f : |A| → |B| and g : |X| → |A|, we have the local exponential
h : Πf (g) → |B| in Set, with counit e : Πf (g) ×|B| |A| → |X|. Let Z represent the
material cartesian product of A and X as in Lemma 8.32, and consider the apg
W = ((X ⊗ Y )?) + Πf (g) + 1
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with ≺ inherited from X ⊗ Y , along with (x, y)′ ≺ j whenever f(x) = h(j) and
e(j, x) = y, and j ≺ ? for all j ∈ Πf (g). Then W is well-founded and extensional
and satisfies |W | ∼= Πf (g); hence Set(V(Set)) is closed under local exponentials. 
Lemma 8.35. If Set satisfies structural fullness, V(Set) satisfies material fullness.
Proof. Analogously to exponentiation, if R :⊆ M × X × Y is a generic set of
multi-valued functions from |X| to |Y |, consider
W = ((X ⊗ Y )?) +M + 1
with ≺ induced from X ⊗ Y along with (x, y)′ ≺ m if R(m,x, y) and m ≺ ?
for all m :∈ M . Then W is a well-founded apg and satisfies the hypothesis of
Lemma 8.28 with n = 1. Its extensional quotient represents a generic set of multi-
valued functions, by a similar argument as for exponentiation. 
Lemma 8.36. If Set is a topos, then V(Set) satisfies the power set axiom, and
the inclusion Set(V(Set)) ↪→ Set is a logical functor.
Proof. For an extensional well-founded apg X, define
Y = (X?) + P |X|+ ?
with ≺ induced from X along with x ≺ A whenever x :∈ |X|, A :∈ P |X|, and
x ∈ A; and also of course A ≺ ?. This is an extensional well-founded apg that
represents the material power set of X. The second statement is immediate. 
Lemma 8.37. V(Set) satisfies the axiom of infinity.
Proof. Let ω = N + 1, with ≺ defined to be < on N together with n ≺ ? for all
n ∈ N . This is an extensional well-founded apg which represents the von Neumann
ordinal ω. The infinity axiom follows from the universal property of the nno. 
Lemma 8.38. If Set satisfies the axiom of choice, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Let X be a well-founded extensional apg such that Xx is inhabited for
each x :∈ |X|. If Y :⊆ X × |X| consists of those (y, x) such that y ∈ Xx, then
the projection Y → |X| is surjective, and hence has a section, say s. From s we
can easily construct a material choice function for X. 
I do not know any way to show that having enough projectives in Set implies
the presentation axiom for V(Set); the problem is that a projective object in Set
seemingly need not admit any structure of a extensional well-founded apg.
Lemma 8.39. V(Set) has transitive closures.
Proof. If X is a well-founded extensional apg, let T = (X?) + 1 with ≺ inherited
from X along with x ≺ ? for all nodes x :∈ X (not just all members). Then T is a
well-founded extensional apg which represents the transitive closure of X. 
Lemma 8.40. V(Set) satisfies Mostowski’s principle.
Proof. Since Set(V(Set)) is closed in Set under finite limits and subsets, any well-
founded extensional graph X constructed in the material set theory V(Set) will
induce such a graph in Set. Therefore, X + 1, with ≺ induced from X along with
x ≺ ? for all nodes x :∈ X, is a well-founded extensional apg, i.e. an object of
V(Set). We then verify that it is transitive and isomorphic to X in V(Set). 
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We now turn to the axiom schemata, for which we need to translate material
formulas in V(Set) into structural ones in Set. We have already been doing this
informally, but for the axiom schemata it is worth being more formal. First of all,
we translate a material context Γ (which is just a list of variables) into a structural
context Γ by replacing each variable with a context that specifies the underlying
data of an apg: objects X and R and arrows R → X × X and ? : 1 → X. If
ρ : Γ → V(Set) is a assignment of material variables to extensional well-founded
apgs in Set, there is an obvious corresponding assignment ρ : Γ → Set.
Now, if ϕ is a material formula in a context Γ, we define a structural formula ϕ
in context Γ follows:
• We replace the material “equality” symbol = by isomorphism ∼= of apgs.
• We replace the material “membership” symbol ∈ by the relation .
• The connectives are unchanged.
• We replace quantifiers over material-sets by quantifiers over well-founded ex-
tensional apgs. For example, (∃x)ϕ(x) becomes pthere exists a well-founded
extensional apg X such that ϕ(X)q.
It is straightforward to see that V(Set) ρ ϕ if and only if Set ρ ϕ. This
translation works quite well for the schemata involving arbitrary formulas.
Lemma 8.41. If Set satisfies separation, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a formula andA ∈ V(Set). Using separation in Set, let U :⊆ |A|
consist of precisely those a :∈ A such that ϕ(A/a). Define B to consist of the root
of A together with all nodes admitting a path to some node in U . Then B is a
well-founded extensional apg, and for any C  A we have C  B iff ϕ(C). 
Lemma 8.42. If Set satisfies full classical logic, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Classical logic for Set implies ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ for any formula ϕ in V(Set). 
Lemma 8.43. If Set satisfies collection, then so does V(Set).
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ V(Set) and that ϕ is a formula such that for any X  A,
there exists a Y ∈ V(Set) with ϕ(X,Y ). This means that for any x :∈ |A|, there
exists a well-founded extensional apg Y such that ϕ(A/x, Y ). By collection in Set,
there is a surjection V
p−− |A| and a pointed graph B in Set/V (where “pointed”
means we have a section s : V → B over V ) such that for each v :∈ V , v∗B is
a well-founded extensional apg and ϕ(A/p(v), v
∗B). It is easy to show that B,
considered as a graph in Set, is still well-founded. And since B is a graph in Set/V ,
its relation ≺ is fiberwise; thus for each v :∈ V we have B/s(v) ∼= v∗B, which is
therefore extensional and accessible. It follows that B + 1, with s(v) ≺ ? for all
v ∈ V , satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 8.28 with n = 1. Its extensional quotient
is then the set desired by the material collection axiom. 
Lemma 8.44. If Set satisfies replacement of contexts, then V(Set) satisfies ma-
terial replacement.
Proof. Suppose that A ∈ V(Set) and that ϕ is a formula such that for any X  A,
there exists a unique Y ∈ V(Set) with ϕ(X,Y ). Thus, for any x :∈ |A|, there exists
a well-founded extensional apg Y such that ϕ(A/x, Y ), and any two such Y are
isomorphic. Since any such isomorphism is unique by Lemma 8.15, replacement of
contexts in Set supplies a pointed graph B in Set/|A| such that for each x :∈ |A|
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we have ϕ(A/x, x
∗B). The extensional quotient of B + 1 then represents the set
desired by material replacement. 
Lemma 8.45. If Set satisfies full induction, then so does V(Set).
Proof. If ϕ(x) is as in the statement of the material induction axiom, then ϕ(X)
is a statement about some X  ω, i.e. X  N . But every X  N is isomorphic to
N/n for a unique n :∈ N , so ϕ(X) is equivalent to a statement ϕ′(n) about some
n :∈ N , which can then be proven by the structural induction axiom. 
Lemma 8.46. If Set satisfies extensional well-founded induction, then V(Set)
satisfies set-induction.
Proof. Just like Lemma 8.45, using induction over the extensional well-founded
relation in Set that underlies any object of V(Set). 
For the schemata involving ∆0-formulas, we require a different translation. Sup-
pose ϕ is a ∆0-formula in a material context Γ = (x1, . . . , xk). Let Θ denote the
structural context (U,R, i1 : R→ U, i2 : R→ U), regarded as the data of a set with
a binary relation which we denote ≺. We define a structural ∆0-formula ϕ∆0 in
the context Γ∆0 = (Θ, x1, . . . , xk), where each xi is now regarded as a ∆0-variable
1→ U . The translation is as follows.
• Each variable xi is unchanged.
• We replace the symbol = by equality of ∆0-terms 1→ U .
• We replace the symbol ∈ by the relation ≺ on elements of U .
• The connectives are unchanged.
• A ∆0-quantifier of the form (∃x ∈ y)ϕ is replaced by a ∆0-quantifier of the form
(∃x :∈ U)(x ≺ y∧ϕ). Similarly, (∀x ∈ y)ϕ is replaced by (∀x :∈ U)(x ≺ y ⇒ ϕ).
Now let ρ : Γ → V(Set) be a variable assignment in material set theory; thus it
supplies well-founded extensional apgs ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xk) in Set. Then
ρ(x1) + · · ·+ ρ(xk) + 1,
with ≺ inherited from the Ai along with ?i ≺ ? for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, satisfies the
hypothesis of Lemma 8.28 with n = 1. Let T denote its extensional quotient, and
let ρ∆0 : Γ
∆0
 → Set be the structural context which assigns U to T with its induced
binary relation ≺, and each xi to [?i].
Lemma 8.47. We have V(Set) ρ ϕ if and only if V(Set) ρ∆0 ϕ
∆0
 .
Proof. Lemma 8.14 implies that T/x ∼= T/y if and only if x = y. Similarly, if
T/x  T/y, then T/x ∼= (T/y)/y′ = T/y′ for some y′ ≺ y, whence x = y′ and so
x ≺ y. The converse is easy, so T/x  T/y if and only if x ≺ y. Thus the atomic
formulas correspond, and the connectives evidently do, so it remains to observe that
∆0-quantifiers are adequately represented by quantifiers over T , since by definition
X  T/y if and only if X ∼= T/x for some x ≺ y. 
Lemma 8.48. V(Set) satisfies ∆0-separation.
Proof. Just like Lemma 8.41, but using ϕ∆0 instead of ϕ, and the ∆0-separation
property of Proposition 5.1 instead of the separation axiom. 
Lemma 8.49. V(Set) satisfies foundation.
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Proof. For any ∆0-formula ϕ in V(Set) and any well-founded apg X ∈ V(Set), we
can form { x :∈ X | ϕ(X/x) } using ∆0-separation, since ϕ(X/x) ⇔ ϕ∆0 (x). The
hypothesis on ϕ implies that this is an inductive subset of X, hence all of it. This
implies the desired conclusion, since for every extensional well-founded apg Y there
is another one X with Y  X. 
Lemma 8.50. If Set is Boolean, then V(Set) satisfies ∆0-classical logic.
Proof. For any ∆0-formula ϕ in V(Set), ∆0-separation supplies a subset { ∅ | ϕ } ⊆
{∅}. If this is complemented in Set, then we must have ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. 
This completes the proof of Theorem 8.18. We deduce the following.
Corollary 8.51. ETCS and BZC are equiconsistent.
Corollary 8.52. Intuitionistic ETCS is equiconsistent with Intuitionistic BZ.
Corollary 8.53. ETCS plus structural collection, and ETCS plus structural re-
placement (of contexts), are both equiconsistent with ZFC.
Corollary 8.54. Intuitionistic ETCS plus structural collection is equiconsistent
with IZF.
So far we have concentrated on building models of pure sets only. However, we
can also allow an arbitrary set of atoms: we fix some A ∈ Set and modify our
definitions as follows. (The definitions not listed below need no modification.)
• An A-graph is a graph X together with a partial function ` : X ⇀ A, such that
dom(`) is a complemented subobject of X, and if x ≺ y then y /∈ dom(`).
• Isomorphisms between A-graphs must preserve the labeling functions `.
• An A-graph is A-extensional if
(i) ` is injective on its domain, and
(ii) for any x, y /∈ dom(`), if z ≺ x⇔ z ≺ y for all z then x = y.
• An A-simulation between A-graphs is a simulation f : X → Y such that for
any x :∈ X, if `(x) or `(f(x)) is defined, then both are and they are equal.
Note that if an A-graph X is an apg and ? ∈ dom(`), then X can have no nodes
other than the root, so X is simply an element of A. Thus, accessible pointed
A-graphs model atoms themselves in addition to sets that can contain atoms.
All the above lemmas, hence also Theorem 8.18, still hold when extensional
well-founded apgs are replaced by A-extensional well-founded accessible pointed
A-graphs. The resulting material set theories satisfy the modified axioms for the-
ories with atoms listed at the end of §2, including decidability of sethood and the
existence of a set of atoms (namely, A), and do allow sethood in axiom schemas.
Remark 8.55. The ability to use any object A of our category Set as “the set of
atoms” means that when working with any fixed finite collection of objects in Set,
we are free to use material set-theoretic language. However, there seems to be no
structural way to construct a single model of material set theory which contains
the elements of all the objects of Set as atoms, since without a way to compare
objects for equality, we cannot compare their elements for equality. In [ABSS14], it
is shown that this is the only obstruction: if we do have a way to interpret equality
on objects (“internally” to Set), then such a model can be constructed.
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9. Material-structural equivalences
Of course, it is natural to ask to what extent the constructions V(−) and Set(−)
are inverse. We have already noticed the canonical inclusion Set(V(Set)) ↪→ Set,
and the following is easy to verify.
Lemma 9.1. The inclusion Set(V(Set)) ↪→ Set is an equivalence if and only if
every object of Set can be embedded into some extensional well-founded graph. 
I propose to call this property of Set the axiom of well-founded materialization.
(Other axioms of materialization would arise from using various kinds of non-well-
founded graphs.)
Note that well-founded materialization follows from the axiom of choice, since
then every object can be well-ordered and thus given the structure of an apg
representing a von Neumann ordinal. We remark in passing that this implies that
“all replacement schemata for ETCS are equivalent.”
Proposition 9.2. Let T1 and T2 be axiom schemata for structural set theory such
that for each i = 1, 2,
(i) if V satisfies ZFC, then Set(V) satisfies Ti, and
(ii) if Set satisfies ETCS+Ti, then V(Set) satisfies ZFC.
Then T1 and T2 are equivalent over ETCS.
Proof. Since ETCS includes AC, for any model of ETCS we have Set ' Set(V(Set)).
Thus, if Set  T1, then by (ii) we have V(Set)  ZFC, hence by (i) we have
Set = Set(V(Set))  T2. The converse is the same. 
We have seen that our axioms of collection and replacement from §7 satisfy (i)
and (ii), so over ETCS they are equivalent to any other such schema. This includes
the reflection axiom of Lawvere [Law64, Remark 12], the axiom CRS of Cole [Col73],
the axiom RepT of Osius [Osi74], and the replacement axiom of McLarty [McL04].
However, our axioms seem to be more appropriate in an intuitionistic context.
Returning to the material-structural comparison, on the other side we have:
Proposition 9.3. If V satisfies the core axioms of material set theory along with
infinity, exponentials, foundation, and transitive closures, then there is a canon-
ical embedding V → V(Set(V)). This map is an isomorphism if and only if V
additionally satisfies Mostowski’s principle.
Proof. By assumption, any x ∈ V has a transitive closure TC(x), which is a well-
founded extensional graph. If we define Y = TC(x) + 1, with ≺ induced by ∈ on
TC(x) and with z ≺ ? for all z ∈ x, then Y is a well-founded extensional apg, i.e.
an object of V(Set(V)). This construction gives a map V → V(Set(V)), and it is
straightforward to verify that it preserves and reflects membership and equality.
Now if this embedding is an isomorphism, then clearly V must satisfy Mostowski’s
principle, since V(Set(V)) does so. Conversely, if V satisfies Mostowski’s principle,
then every X ∈ V(Set(V)) is isomorphic in V to a transitive set, and therefore
equal in V(Set(V)) to something in the image of the embedding. 
We say that a material and a structural set theory are “equivalent” if we have a
bijection between
(i) isomorphism classes of models of the material set theory and
(ii) equivalence classes of models of the structural set theory.
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Corollary 9.4. ETCS is equivalent to MOST (i.e. BZC plus transitive closures
and Mostowski’s principle).
Corollary 9.5. ETCS plus structural collection (or replacement) is equivalent to
ZFC.
Corollary 9.6. Intuitionistic ETCS plus well-founded materialization is equivalent
to Intuitionistic BZ plus transitive closures and Mostowski’s principle (which we
may call “Intuitionistic MOST”).
Corollary 9.7. Intuitionistic ETCS plus structural collection and well-founded
materialization is equivalent to IZF.
Remark 9.8. The theory M0 of [Mat01] consists of the core axioms together with
power sets and full classical logic. If V  M0, then V(Set(V)) is precisely the
model W1 constructed in [Mat01, §2], which satisfies M0 plus regularity, transitive
closures, and Mostowski’s principle, and inherits infinity and choice from V. (In
the presence of classical logic and power sets, the axiom of infinity is unnecessary
for the construction V(−).) In particular, if V  ZBQC, then V(Set(V))  MOST,
while V(Set(V)) ∼= V if we already had V  MOST.
Remark 9.9. Mitchell [Mit73] observes that for Boolean topoi, the constructions we
have called V(−) and Set(−) can be made into a pair of adjoint functors, modulo
some 2-categorical technicalities not addressed therein. I expect this is also true in
a constructive context. Moreover, the adjunction should be idempotent, and thus
induce the above equivalences between the images of the two functors.
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